Tuesday, September 8, 2009

Debunking A Myth










India-based intellectuals, be they civilians dabbling in strategic affairs or even serving or retired armed services chiefs, have repeatedly demonstrated a remarkable consistency in making ludicrous and largely discredited claims about Pakistan’s military-industrial capabilities that seemingly tend to give the Pakistan Armed Forces a debilitating force projection superiority over their Indian counterparts. The latest such accusation to have surfaced concerns the alleged efforts by the Pakistan Navy to modify its ship-launched Boeing-built RGM-84A and submarine-launched UGM-84A Harpoon anti-ship cruise missiles (of 1984 vintage) into ship-launched 50nm-range dual-role anti-ship strike and land attack precision-guided missiles. True or false? Can such modifications be done covertly without any involvement by the guided-missile’s OEM?

The best and most convincing answer comes from none other than the OEM itself—Boeing Integrated Defense Systems, which had by the mid-1990s successfully modified the Harpoon into precision-guided land attack missile called SLAM-ER (standoff land attack missile-extended range), and had also developed the related Harpoon Shipboard Command Launch Control System and the AWW-14 data-link pod (this being for the air-launched variant of the SLAM-ER). The above slides clearly demonstrate what exactly were the modifications carried out by Boeing IDS on the basic Harpoon, and how this missile has since evolved into the SLAM-ER (which is now being offered to the Indian Air Force along with both the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and F-16IN Super Viper medium multi-role combat aircraft). Taking the cue from the SLAM-ER, both MBDA and Israel Military Industries (IMI) have adopted the same optronics-based precision-guidance approach for their SCALP and Delilah air-/ship-/submarine-launched standoff land attack missiles (as has the Pakistan Air Force with the Ra’ad air-launched land attack cruise missile).

Consequently, it emerges from the above that for any Pakistani military-industrial entity to modify the Harpoon into a LACM, it would not only have to radically redesign the missile’s nose section, but will also have to develop a passive optronic sensor and integrate it with the missile’s inertial navigation system, develop a new Shipboard Command Launch Control System, and develop the airborne data-link pod so that the LACM can be provided with over-the-horizon targetting (OTHT) cues at its terminal cruise phase. Which means, while the LACM will have to be launched from a warship lurking dangerously close to a hostile coastline, a defenceless manned airborne platform (either fixed-wing or rotary-winged) too will have to be in the warship’s immediate vicinity for providing OTHT cues.

Given such daunting R & D challenges, wouldn’t it be much easier for Pakistan to acquire and deploy ground-/air-/ship-launched LACMs like the Babur and Ra’ad, both of which not only have much longer engagement envelopes, but also heavier warheads for guaranteeing assured target destruction? And if at all it is so easy to modify or even reverse-engineer anti-ship cruise missiles of 1980s vintage, then can someone explain why the DRDO’s labs (like the DRDL, GTRE, IRDE and DARE) have still been unable to reverse-engineer the decommissioned BAE Systems-built Sea Eagle anti-ship cruise missiles (whose performance parameters closely resembled those of the Harpoon A) that have now been decommissioned and are available for total strip-down and cloning? Why has the DRDO been unable to re-engineer the Sea Eagle into an unmanned high-speed target drone capable of subjecting the Indian Navy's Barak-1 and Kashtan-M close-in anti-missile defence systems to some pretty realistic threat simulation environments of the kind expected to be faced in wartime? Why does this operational requirement (for the drones) remain unfulfilled till this day?
India’s civilian and military decision-makers—it thus seems—can bark galore but cannot bite.—Prasun K. Sengupta

290 comments:

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Prasun K Sengupta said...

To Anon@12:17PM: I'm sure the product websites of Raytheon and Northrop Grumman have the brochures downloadable in PDF format that will contain the info you require.

To Aadi: If you browse through my story posts of last year you will find the upgrade diagram relating to the installation of the combat management suite (ISUS-90) and related sonar suite.

To Anon@12:20PM: Well, we must carefully examine the statement from Phazotron JSC in terms of what it says and what it doesn't say. Only in terms of detection range, Phazotron claims that it has overshot the detection range parameters. Fine, but what about the number of targets being tracked and of these how many can be engaged (simulaneously or in sequence)? What about the MTBF? How many modes of operation have been certified through in-house laboratory tests and initial flight-tests? On all these issues Phazotron remains silent. Therefore, until these questions are answered one will not be able to do a fair comparison between the Zhuk-AE and its European, Israeli and US counterparts.
As for the superiority of Russian arborne radars over their European and US counterparts, it is fairly easily explained by the following:
1) When the IAF procured the Mirage 2000H/TH in the mid-1980s, the RDM X-band monopulse radar had look-up shoot-up and look-down shoot-down modes for air combat, as well as track-while-scan (of four airborne targets) and ground mapping modes. On the other hand, the MiG-29B-12's on-board X-band monopulse radar in the mid-1980s had look-up shoot-up and look-down shoot-down modes for air combat, but only ONE target could be displayed and engaged. There was no air-to-ground mode at all for the MiG-29B-12.
2) By 1989, radars like the Grifo-F, APG-67 and EL/M-2032 had a guaranteed MTBF exceeding 300 hours, while corresponding figures for Russian radars stood at 100 hours.
3) The Rafale's original RBE PESA in the early 1990s had a MTBF exceeding 200 hours, while that of the NO-11M 'Bars' PESA till this day is limited at 100 hours. Similarly, those of the EL/M-2052 and APG-79 are 900 hours, while that of the Zhuk-AE is claimed (not demonstrated) as being 500 hours.
That above should suffice for you to reach and informed conclusion.

Aryan said...

Hi Prasun!
Will Tejas Mk.2 have to go through IOC & FOC like the current version? If yes how long will it take?

Prasun K Sengupta said...

To Aryan: Actually, the Tejas Mk1 has not yet entered the IOC stage, simply because no deliveries have been made as yet to an IAF squadron. The Mk1 is still undergoing the flight certification and weapons qualification phases and only after these are successfully accomplished will the LSPs be delivered to a designated operational IAF squadron. After that, another six to eight months will have to elapse before that squadron achieves IOC with the inducted aircraft. Another 12 months later after all the squadron aircrew and ground-crew have achieved complete proficiency in handling the aircraft, will the FOC status be conferred on the squadron. And yes, this entire process of flight certification and weapons qualification phases will have to be traversed afresh for the Tejas Mk2 LCA as well, but these phases should be completed within 18 months. IOC and FOC for the squadron equipped with the Tejas Mk2 should be achieved after another 18 months. All in all, from the time the first Tejas Mk2 makes its maiden flight, another 28 months will elapse before the aircraft is declared FOC-qualified.

Anonymous said...

Prasun,
If the Mk2 will incorporate all the techs & amendments that you have mentioned, it is going to look exactly like the Gripen NG!! Don't you think? Both will be using a 95 - 100Kn class engine.

Think about it, Gripen is competing under the name Medium multirole combat aircraft yet Tejas is called Light Combat Aircraft. So why not include the Tejas Mk2 also in the ongoing MMRCA competition as it will be delivered in the same time frame.

Anonymous said...

Prasun da,

Thanks again.

Is it true that Russia has offered about 18-20 SU-35 aircraft's to India.The SU-35 is said to be the the most advanced fighter aircraft in the Russian inventory.Will the IAF react positively to the offer?Will the IAF's SU-30MKI after up-gradation,as you have mentioned in the Force magazine, become as potent as the SU-35 and the F-35?

What are the EW and other capabilities of J-10B?How good are they compared to the IAF's SU-30MKI?

Is the DRDO planning to make similar missiles as the Meteor so that the IAF stay ahead of PAF & PLAAF?

I think the IN should have gone VLF hull-mounted & towed-array sonars instead of low-frequency HUMSA-NG & NAGAN ATAS.Will they go for VLF hull-mounted & towed-array sonars in their Project 15B & 15C DDG'S and Project 17A FFG or the same HUMSA-NG & NAGAN ATAS.

Prasun K Sengupta said...

To Anon@4:01PM: My point exactly. The Tejas Mk2 LCA will end up like the Gripen IN and F-16IN Super Viper! So what exactly is the objective of acquiring new-generation M-MRCAs? If the objective is only to replace the aircraft being decommissioned (like the older MiG-21Ms and bis, MiG-23BNs, MiG-23MFs and older MiG-2&Ms) then might as well as go for up to an additional 50 Su-30MKIs to add to the 50 + 140 + 40 + 50 Su-30MKIs already confirmed for procurement.

To Anon@4:02PM: Yes, the offer was made earlier this year, but it is unlikely to be picked up by the IAF, since the Su-30MKIs will be upgraded in future anyway, making them more advanced than the Su-35.
The J-10B has RWRs and countermeasures dispensers but does not have a missile approach warning system or a laser warning receiver or the provision for using towed-decoys, all of which will be installed on te Su-30MKI. Furthermore, the Chinese are nowhere near to even fielding airborne PESA radars, leave alone AESA.
Yes, there are plans to induct Meteor-type BVRAAMs but the IAF may also procure a small number (about 20) Novator KS-172 long-range AAMs as well. The DRDO will not get clearance to develop such BVRAAMs unless and until it completes developing the Astra BVRAAM.
For the three Project 15B DDGs, all six Project 1135.6 FFGs, three Project 17 FFGs and four Project 28 ASW corvettes, the Indian Navy has already prepared global RFPs for procuring VLF hull-mounted panoramic sonars, active/passive towed-array sonars, and helicopter-mounted dunking sonars. The upgraded Sea King Mk42Bs and Ka-28PLs too will have such VLF dunking sonars, and not the Mihir LF sonar. The Navy's existing Abhay-class ASW corvettes are also due to get new VLF towed-array sonars, and the six Scorpene SSKs will be equipped with VLF thin-line towed-array sonars.

sbm said...

Prasun, I hope that Force is not going to join the panic crowd and say that India has no deterrent and that none of the weapons work and that it can't make anything larger than a 15kT weapon.

You know and I know that if everything Santhanam says is correct, India can manufacture a 17KT boosted-fission weapon (the primary of the TN device) and scale either that or the fission device to some extent.

It is not ideal, but it will work.

When Brahma Chellaney goes and writes India has no deterrent, I hope that Force doesn't join the crowd.

We are talking here of technical and hardware/warhead issues. Let us put C3 to one side (for now)

sbm said...

Prasun, this is a summary of my thoughts on this issue. I sent it as an e-mail to B. Raman and am posting it in as many places as possible for some feedback:

(1) Dr. Santhanam has claimed that the TN test achieved a yield of between 23-27 kilotons.

(2) If that statement is taken to be accurate - and let us assume that it is - that yield is substantially higher than that claimed by analysts in the West who using data and assumptions that were at times questionable suggested a much lower yield.

(3) Dr Santhanam in his op-ed piece claimed the deployment of 25 kiloton warheads on a wide scale.

(4) Subsequently he has said that India's deterrent consists only of 15 kiloton weapons - some consistency would be appreciated in this regard.

(5) What nobody has explained is why India has built missiles - with Santhanam himself in DRDO - with payloads of between 700 and 1500kg ?

(6) The other issue that has not been tackled is that of the primary stage of the TN device which has not been disputed as being a boosted-fission device and which, if Santhanam's figures are correct would have had to have a yield and produced a yield of between 15 and 17 kilotons.

(7) Taking Dr. Santhanam's words as being accurate some conclusions can immediately be drawn:
(a) India's weapons teams were not convinced of the TN test and did not weaponize any thermonuclear weapons
(b) India's deployed nuclear weapons weigh between 700kg and 1500kg - based on the Agni payloads
(c) Both fission and boosted-fission types that were tested worked.

(8) Admiral Suresh Mehta's words were very guarded:

"As far as we are concerned, scientists have given us a certain capability which is enough to provide requisite deterrence...the deterrent is tried and tested"

(9) No 15kiloton or 25 kiloton fission or boosted fission device weighs 700-1500kg. At most the figures for those types will range between 170kg and 300kg with Indian design technology.

(10) Nobody - either critics or supporters - have considered the possibility of the scalability of either the fission or boosted-fission weapons/devices tested. This aspect of Indian weapons research in the last decade is what needs to be examined if one is to assess the Indian nuclear deterrent.

(11) The French MR31 120kiloton warhead used on their SSBS-S2 IRBM was a pure fission warhead weighed 700kg using about 25kg of weapons-grade plutonium (which is a considerable amount). The successor warhead, the MR41 was a boosted-fission warhead for the MSBS M1 and M2 SLBMs and had a yield of 500 kilotons and weighed 700kg.

To what yield are India's fission and/or boosted-fission designs scalable ?
Do the large payloads of the Agni series lead to the inexorable conclusion that large fission or boosted-fission weapons are the ones deployed ?

Without an analysis of this question, everybody who is attempting to tell the world they know what India's deterrent consists of is merely whistling in the wind - adding nothing but noise to a debate that has seen Dr. Santhanam being described as a nuclear scientist (when he is not) and Dr. Kalam being told to shut up because he is not a nuclear scientist and which has seen the POK-1 1974 test team turn on the 1998 team without remembering that the yield of their test in 1974 was also hotly disputed.

There are no heroes in this drama. What India needs to do is ignore the rhetoric and analyse whether its fission and boosted-fission capability can reliably deliver warheads in the 50-100 kiloton class to the armed forces with confidence.

Kammie Kamal said...

>>>>>>>>To Dumpskin: Yes, they do. Because that's what ensures nuclear deterrence. Unlike conventional warfare, whose success or failure is determined by the respective operational arts of the warring parties, when it comes to nuclear deterrence, the damage and destruction caused by WMDs is quantifiable fairly accurately and that's what gave rise to the doctrine of mutually assured destruction since the 1960s.

You must have said this with tongue-in-cheek.

Which Government Heads in '60s declared they have so and so number of nulcear warheads ?

All the estimation is based on intelligence and indirect assumption.

Still some believe there might be some unaccounted warheads after SU disintegration.

Anonymous said...

Here is an analysis of Prasun K Sengupta on Pakistan's nukes in INDIA UNDER ATTACK & OTHER MUSINGS !! blog on req by its admin

http://bengalunderattack.blogspot.com/2009/05/pakistans-nuclear-arsenal-us-insistence.html

Prasun K Sengupta said...

To sbm: Sanjay, it is not about panicking. Ever since its inception in September 2003 FORCE has been highlighting the dysfunctional kind of strategic decision-making that always keeps the armed forces at arms length. This is precisely the reason why on the eve of OP Parakram the then COAS Gen Paddy Padmanabhan spent 48 hours with the DRDO and DAE top brass at BARC to get convincing answers about the viability of India's minimum credible n-deterrent! In fact, by then itself it had emerged very clearly that the thermonuclear devices were not being weaponised for good reason. Santhanam's recent disclosures only reinforce that but they don;t come as a surprising revelation at all. For those of us that have from time to time had access to the operational-level warfighting plans and contingencies since late 1998, it was a known reality that the thermonuclear deterrent did not exist in India. But as to what FORCE will write about in the October issue is really not in my hands as I'm just a humble editorial contributor who has not charged even a cent thus far from the Publishers/Editors of the publication for the contributions. As such I do not meddle in or influence the editorial policies of FORCE in any form whatsoever. And I don't want to as well.
No sane-minded individual, Chellaney incuded, will claim that India has no n-deterrent, as the integrity of a fission-based device was proven beyond doubt way back in May 1974, so I reckon that particular issue can be put for rest once and for all. Your 11 points are in perfect order. However, in terms of weightage for delivery systems like the Agni-1 and Agni-2 you do need to factor in the enacapsulation of decoys within the warhead section (where the unitary boosted-fission warhead resides). With the Agni-3 family, however, MIRVs (up to three) plus decoys will be accommodated. But this much is clear and none of the P-5s are contesting or questioning: the fission-based and boosted-fission-based warheads within India's n-arsenal are a proven reality beyond doubt and therefore do constitute a credible n-deterrent. In terms of scalability, the booste-fission devices are scalable to between 60kT and 80kT. And if India were to sign up for the FMCT, the Govt of India has decided that it does not require more than 3 metric tonnes of weapons-grade fissile materials. Therefore, in conclusion, I personally cannot fathom any possible reason for an discerning individual (such as the two of us) to be panicky. Let pragmatism prevail.

Prasun K Sengupta said...

To Dumpskin: What were you smoking when you posted your comment above? How can you possibly expect India to adopt the same posture as those adopted by the n-weapons powers in the 1960s? The strategic fundamentals of the past era do not apply to the present one. For one India is not one of the P-5, therefore its nuclear weaponisation efforts will always have to be conducted within an environment of 'strategic restraint regimes' in the aftermath of already-inked treaties like NPT, SALT-1/2 and START-1, and treaties like CTBT and FMCT now being deliberated upon in Geneva.

Anonymous said...

Hi Prasun,
Any update on HAL's Light Observation Helicopter?

Prasun K Sengupta said...

Thus far no firm orders have been received from the MoD for any HAL-designed-and-built single-engined LOH. HAL claims it could begin delivering such helicopters within six years of an order being received. The same also goes for the HTT-40 basic turboprop trainer. To me, six years is too long a time for either project. The prototype of a single-engined LOH variant of the Dhruv ALH ought to roll out within two years of a firm order being placed. The same also goes for the HTT-40, since HAL had in the early 1990s already fabricated a functional prototype of the HTT-35 basic turboprop trainer.

Kammie Kamal said...

Sengupta,

The point I like to ram is if there was MAD in 60s without any declaration of assets, it can exists now too. With India's NFU there is no need for any decalaration of assets. This serve the purpose of deterence too.

If India is insisted to be open like NWS let those P5 grant India the same status as NWS.

Prasun K Sengupta said...

To Dumpskin: What NFU are you talking about? Has India's Parliament passed and ratified a resolution that says India is fully committed to a NFU policy? Until and unless India does so, no one will believe whether or not India adheres to a NFU. As for declaration of assets it has to happen sooner than later, that's the writing on the wall as far as credible nuclear deterrence goes. Deterrence does not come from policy ambuigity. And in case you ask what about Israel, the answer is that in Israel's case, nuclear ambiguity is a deliberate attitude, and not a declaratory policy, since Israel, unlike India, has never gone overtly nuclear.

Anonymous said...

to anon at 12:20

Is it true that the Zhuk-AE AESA is fully compliant with the IAF's M-MRCA
-----------------------------
if this radar is not compliant with MRCA RFP,its obvious that russians would not claim what you said in your comment

Anonymous said...

to prasun

Phazotron JSC in terms of what it says and what it doesn't say. Only in terms of detection range, Phazotron claims that it has overshot the detection range parameters. Fine, but what about the number of targets being tracked and of these how many can be engaged (simulaneously or in sequence)? What about the MTBF?

Therefore, until these questions are answered one will not be able to do a fair comparison between the Zhuk-AE and its European, Israeli and US counterparts.

As for the superiority of Russian arborne radars over their European and US counterparts, it is fairly easily explained by the following:
1) When the IAF procured the Mirage 2000H/TH in the mid-1980s, the RDM X-band monopulse radar had look-up shoot-up and look-down shoot-down modes for air combat, as well as track-while-scan (of four airborne targets) and ground mapping modes. On the other hand, the MiG-29B-12's on-board X-band monopulse radar in the mid-1980s had look-up shoot-up and look-down shoot-down modes for air combat, but only ONE target could be displayed and engaged. There was no air-to-ground mode at all for the MiG-29B-12.
2) By 1989, radars like the Grifo-F, APG-67 and EL/M-2032 had a guaranteed MTBF exceeding 300 hours, while corresponding figures for Russian radars stood at 100 hours.
3) The Rafale's original RBE PESA in the early 1990s had a MTBF exceeding 200 hours, while that of the NO-11M 'Bars' PESA till this day is limited at 100 hours. Similarly, those of the EL/M-2052 and APG-79 are 900 hours, while that of the Zhuk-AE is claimed (not demonstrated) as being 500 hours.
That above should suffice for you to reach and informed conclusion.
--------------------------------
sir, your conclusion is only 50% true

when phazatron JSC says their radar meets the RFP requirement it means it has validated all modes including ground modes and sea modes

PHAZATRON clearly says zhuk ae can 30 targets can be tracked and 6 of them engaged simultaneously and MTBF is 600 hours

130km range set as REQUIREMENT IN RFP is for air target detection

and for your query about the MTBF hours of american radars is good only when their aircrafts are in US and when those aircrafts are deployed somewhere else MTBF hours reduces dramatically

and about N019 radar on mig29 has superior look down shoot down range than the RDM radar on m2000

and N019 can engage two targets simultaneouly witH R 27 missile and track 10 targets for the same reason mig29 is fitted with R77 missile which can easily knock out m2000

kopyo radar on mig21bison can engage 2 targets simultaneouly while mig21 lancer fitted with elta2032 can engage only one target at a time

not to mention kopyo has better detection range than elta2032

and as far as the MTBF of kopyo is concerned 110-120 hours and india is the only customenr of this radar

when india bought kopyo radar it was new product and had only 10 hours of MTBF due to the fact that it was right out of factory and to bring MTBF hours to desired hours that takes at least 1.5 to 2.5 years cuz no product just out of development no product meets the required performance for which it is designed but this rather takes some time to meet those parameters after the product is used for some time and gradually bring it to desired performance

Prasun K Sengupta said...

It is not about being 50% true or 10% true. What Phazotron JSC said to the Russian Press applies only to the airborne target detection range, which has been validated. There was nothing said at all about other modes of operation. The issue therefore of how may targets can be tracked or engaged is immaterial because there is a big difference between 'can' and 'has been demonstrated'. The same also applies to the MTBF. Those figures you mentioned about the Zhuk-AE were displayed in posters as far back as 2007. But it doesn't mean that such figures are guaranteed in any contract document based on actual trials.
As for MTBF figures of US-built radars, I was referring to the demonstrated figures in countries like Japan, Taiwan, Australia and Singapore. Nothing to do with US territory.
As for the NO19 radar those on board the IAF MiG-29Bs can detect, track and engage only 1 target at a time. The follow-on radar, the Topaz, which has in service in limited numbers with the IAF, can track only four targets and engage two. No IAF MiG-29s are armed with the R-77 BVRAAM. As of now the R-77 is qualified only on board the IAF's Su-30MKI and MiG-21 Bison. As for the range of the EL/M-2032 and Kopyo, there are various variants of the EL/M-2032 that go on board the MiG-21M, Sea Harrier, F-16 and F-5. Each such variant has a different range classification depending on the aircraft equipped with it. Therefore, a one-on-one comparison with the EL/M-2032 regarding engagement envelopes will not be possible. But in terms of size, volume and MTBF, the figures for the EL/M-2032 way better than that for the Kopyo.

3dB said...

Sorry to be off topic, but I ran across your article on 21 May 2009 about the HQ-9. A lot of articles on the internet confuse me with respect to what is a part of the HQ-9 and what is a part of the HQ-12.

1. Where did the designator HT-233 first come from, and is this radar the engagement radar for HQ-9? The one that looks like a Russian 30N6 with an antenna that looks like Patriot.

2. I thought the SJ-231 was associated with the HQ-12, but a blog comment several months ago you left said "the SJ-231 is not the radar itself, but the designation for the command-and-control system for the KS-1A". So it's not a radar system? If not, how is it related to the HQ-9. Your article mentions the TWS-312 as a designator for what sounds like a command post.

Please contact me at pimbosale@gmail.com if you'd like to speak further. I think your article is very interesting from a global air defense standpoint.

Anonymous said...

Prasun da,

Thanks for the reply.

The IN chief has recently said that the navy plans to induct at least 100 warships in the next decade.Can you classify them i.e.how many destroyers,frigates,corvettes etc. will they consist of?

About the next batch of Project 1135.6 FFGs,the deal which is to be signed soon,you have said that the Russians have agreed to install Israeli AESA radars like the MF-STAR & naval version of L-band EL/L-2080 radar.My question is will they agree to install the Barak-8 system in place of Shtil system.

When will the IN issue the RFP for their next line of submarine construction?It is already getting too late with the Scorpenes getting delayed by 2 years and will be inducted in 2014 only by which time the IN will be left with only 6-8 submarines from the present 14 nos.

Will the IN navy go for the Armaris SSX-22 subs or the Amur class of subs?

Many reports say that the German Type-214 SSK's that the PN is acquiring are superior to the IN's Scorpene class of subs.Is it true? Please elaborate on their capabilities.

Thank you.

Anonymous said...

to prasun

What Phazotron JSC said to the Russian Press applies only to the airborne target detection range, which has been validated. There was nothing said at all about other modes of operation. The issue therefore of how may targets can be tracked or engaged is immaterial because there is a big difference between 'can' and 'has been demonstrated'.
-----------------------------
are yaar, if they have tested the air to air modes and telling people the detection range of air target detection range so they must have tested other air to grounds modes also and for this they are not going to call "media persons" to show them the demonstration of air to grounds modes

Anonymous said...

Dear Prasun
I posted the couple of queries couple of days back (I appended below this comment). I am not sure if you noticed that. If my question is not stupid, could you please comment?

Also, I have another question.
If India doesn't choose Gripen, Rafale, Mig35 and if Brazil doesn't opt for either of Rafale or Gripen, does that mean that, two of the fighter planes are gone in history?

Dear Prasun,
I have been going through some of PLA's aggression against India for the last one year.
It started with a news that, PLAN forced to surface Indian Navy submarine, which was following the PLAN frigates after entering into INdian Ocean.

Indian Navy denied that. No IN submarine surfaced by PLAN. I do not know whether you made any comments on this.

Anyway, if IN was correct (I think they were), I feel that by such a rumored article, China was testing how India and Indian Media respond to such a news. But Indian Govt and Media didn't give much importance to that news. Later China denied such incident.
Coming back to the present PLA or PAP intrusion, I feel that, China is testing India, how India will responds to this intrusion.

Your comments please. do you have any knowledge which submarine was following PLAN.

Swapnil said...

Sir,a few questions if u dont mind

1.Can u pls define what is minimum deterence policy in simple words(m confused)?

2. Do India and Pak hv one?

3. How does it work?

4. Also there was a report some time back about that french and british submarines colliding and havin nuclear weapons on board....so does IN subs also carry nuclear weapons durin peacetime?

5. Do other surface ships carry armed missiles durin patrols like the one in gulf of Aden?are nuclear weapons on board??

6. I came across a report about an aussie sub. mishap while spyiin in Asia, its also mentiond that they spy Indian ships too(http://www.gentleseas.blogspot.com/)
So do our subs also spy aussie and other navy ships??Is spyyin usin sub. a normal trend around d world?

thanks

Swapnil said...

Also, if u read this
http://newwars.wordpress.com/2009/09/17/the-aircraft-carrier-gap/, there is a CBG of USN which operates in bay of bengal!!! Is it to control any aggression by IN in future??
And is that the same reason, IN wants to hv its own CBG at Andman& Nicobar islands as soon as possible??
thanks

Prasun K Sengupta said...

To autoTrack: KS-1A MR-SAM is the export designation for the HQ-12. The HQ-9 LR-SAM as yet has no export designation. HT-233 is the original designation of the PESA engagement radar. The export designation of this radar is the H-200. Yhe SJ-231 command-and-control system is associated with the HQ-9. The TWS-312 is the command-and-control system for the
HQ-12/KS-1A.

To Anon@3:45PM: I'm not aware of the exact breakdown of these 100 vessels. The 7th, 8th and 9th Project 1135.6 FFGs,the VL Shtil system will be on board. The Israeli systems will be on the to-be-built seven Project 17A and up to four Project 15B DDGs. When will the IN issue the RFP for their next line of submarine construction? The answer: anytime now. Even though the IN has 14 submarines, no more than eight are operational at any given time. The German Type-214 SSKs that the PN is acquiring will have the same identical combat management systems and sonar suite as those ALREADY installed on the four upgraded IN Class 209/Type 1500 SSKs.

To Anon@4:45PM: Again you're being presumptuous and assuming what you want to believe. Remember, Phazotron JSC itself made the announcement to the Russian press about what the Zhuk-AE has been able to achieve thus far. Furthermore, you have no credible supporting statement from anyone which says that the Zhuk-AE is today classified as 'combat qualified'. Unlike you, prospective customers do not rely on suppositions or assumptions. They go by what is being stated or demonstrated in black and white.

Prasun K Sengupta said...

To Anon@1:28AM: Brazil to the best of my knowledge has already taken the political decison to go for the Rafale. As for the Indian M-MRCA competition, all technological and financial indicators point to the inherent superiority of the US offers for either the F-16IN or F/A-18E/F.
Now, coming to the issue of ‘Chinese aggression’, in reality there’s been no aggression or encroachment. There have been intrusions, yes, aggressive patrolling by the PAP, yes, but definitely no aggression after 1967at Nathu La. The so-called faceoff between an IN submarine and a PLA Navy warship in the Horn of Africa was a non-event as no such faceoff took place. The story, as it turned out, was a fictionalised account from a Chinese reporter who was subsequently sacked from his job due to unprofessionalism.

To Swapnil: All your questions on MCD can be answered by Op-Ed articles written by the likes of Rear Admiral (Ret’d) Raja Menon in OUTLOOK magazine and INDIAN EXPRESS newspaper. No IN diesel-electric submarines carry any nuclear weapons on board because no such nuclear weapons have been developed in India as yet. That kind of R & D effort is still underway. Yes, IN submarines do routinely try to record the acoustic signatures of any other warship whenever the opportunity presents itself. Any warship, not just a US Navy Carrier Battle Group, is entitled to navigate along international waters, be it in the Bay of Bengal or anywhere else. And what makes you think the US Navy ever had any plans to control or neutralise any kind of aggression by the Indian Navy anywhere? The US Navy was never in an aggressive mode even in December 1971 and its rules of engagement then never received any directive from anyone to intervene in the war—a fact well-proven now by declassified US State Dept documentation. And FYI the Indian Navy had its sole CBG operating from the Andaman & Nicobar Islands during the 1971 India-Pakistan war. Nothing new.

Unknown said...

Will India be procuring Thales's Ground Master 400 radars?

Prasun K Sengupta said...

To Nava: Firstly, happy new year's greetings, and Eid Mubarak to one and all. Now, the answer to your question: Yes. You can get details of this deal at: http://www.defensenews.com/osd_story.php?sh=VSDI&i=3944862

Anonymous said...

to Prasun K Sengupta
i have read ur posts on india u atk as well here on pak nukes. you have stated that pak has 10 fission devices out of 12 yet in the same post you state plutonium being detected by US intel

"(when the US confronted China with clinching evidence--the radioactive PLUTONIUM's atmoshperic residue) and China admitted to its pivotal role in Pakistan's n-weaponisation "

2)I would like you to elaborate- SRBMs can accomodate a fission dev(blky)due to their short range and that irbms or icbms
need a smaller lighter warhead (to travel the dist)which is why fusion devices are sought(apart from yield)and is why Iran may never have nuke even if capable of mastering fission devices(not deliverable to its targets securely for ranges>2000km) since their carriers would require unachievable thrust
is it as simple as this or does a lot more factors come into play here.
3)does techonology exist which could provide pak capabilities to launch fission dev thro its homegrown missiles which is not accessible to pak as of now

Prasun K Sengupta said...

To Anon@11:12AM: One has to bear in mind that the China-supplied nuclear warheads are of the tactical nuke-type only, which can be delivered by M-9/M-11 ballistic missiles. For the newer M-18/Shaheen-2 and Ghauri-1 ballistic missiles, no ready-made n-warheads of any type have been supplied to date by China, although this situation could well change depending on the existential threat facing Pakistan in the event of another India-Pakistan all-out war in future. You may find the revelations in the following weblink more interesting: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6839044.ece

Anonymous said...

Prasun if we don't have a credible Nuclear deterrent then why the hell are we making SSBNs & ICBMs? Whats your opinion do you think that our bombs work?

3dB said...

But in this post in June:

http://trishulgroup.blogspot.com/2009/06/50ekj-2000-aew-cs-of-china-detailed.html

you noted:

"To Anon@1:36PM: What the article does not say is that the first two photos of the HT-233 target engagement radar was first published by my magazine TEMPUR way back in 2002 as part of an article I wrote on the KS-1A M-SAM, based on the data supplied to me by CPMIEC. In addition, the SJ-231 is not the radar itself, but the designation for the command-and-control system for the KS-1A. Also, the production variant H-200 radar's antenna has 10 separate sections, and not the seven as shown in the rather dated photo."

Clearly the HQ-12 and HQ-9 are completely different systems. The 12 is command guided and has a range of up to 45-50km. Meanwhile, the HQ-9 is attempting to be a Patriot PAC-2 or S-300PMU1/2 competitor.

Your May article contains a lot of detail, but not much makes sense to me. Like this sentence:

"The HT-233 radar is automatically controlled by a digital weapons control computer housed within the ECC, and cable link is used to connect the SJ-231 to the TWS-312, which is the only manned station in a HQ-9 Battery and it provides the human interface for control of all automated functions."

1. Blogs like yours and the APA site show a picture of the HT-233 as the two cabin engagement radar for HQ-9 on the single chassis. You noted H-200. Everything I've seen on H-200 is related to HQ-12.

2. I've seen a Chinese brochure that contains the designator SJ-231 and looks like a HT-233 minus the guidance van.
(http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_3wZSwFvZzqM/SfqCayMA-lI/AAAAAAAACT4/UXd0HqfUyF8/s400/SJ-231_guidance_station.jpg)

Why do you consider the SJ-231 command and control?

3. I've never heard TWS 312 anywhere else. Are you talking to Chinese manufacturers for this data?

When I look at APA's deployed HQ-9 photos (http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-PLA-IADS-Radars.html#mozTocId64472), I see one TER in the back and the TAR on the left. Everyone is consistent with calling the TAR a YLC-2V. Let's call the TER an HT-233. That's all I see in that image, meaning I don't still understand what the ECC, SJ-231, and TWS-312 would look like.

Why would the YLV-2V not be talking directly to the HT-233?

Prasun K Sengupta said...

To autoTrack: I'm repeating once again what wrote yesterday. KS-1A MR-SAM is the export designation for the HQ-12. The HQ-9 LR-SAM as yet has no export designation. HT-233 is the original designation of the PESA engagement radar. The export designation of this radar is the H-200. Yhe SJ-231 command-and-control system is associated with the HQ-9. The TWS-312 is the command-and-control system for the
HQ-12/KS-1A. The data showing the HT-233 mounted on the SJ-231 is terribly dated and more than three years old. Much has changed since then in terms of systems configuration due to the changes insisted upon by the concerned customers. As for TARs, it can be CETC's YLV-2V or any other L-band or S-band 3-D airspace surveillance radar. Any TAR will never directly communicate with any TER as the command-and-control fucntions are always entrusted to the respective ECCs at the Battery-, Regimental- and Brigade-levels. It is therefore up to the ECC to activate the requisite TERs. It is obvious that all such data comes directly from the OEMs.

Anonymous said...

Prasun Sir
Can we expect more missile silos in the next Arihant subs that are being built or will they be exactly like the tech demonstrator?

Prasun K Sengupta said...

The Arihant presently can have six silos for launching Shourya-type ballistic missiles, or four silos for launching 3,500km-range SLBMs. The two follow-on SSBNs will each have eight missile silos capable of housing 5,000km-range SLBMs but the silos will protrude out of the SSBN's pressure hull (similar to what one sees on the Russian Delta-3 and delta-4 SSBNs). But the Navy has asked the DRDO to develop SLBMs with 8,500km-range. If the DRDO can do this, then the SSBN's design will have to be radically modified.

Anonymous said...

Prasunji,
In the link you provided "You may find the revelations in the following weblink more interesting: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/art", the last "part" was missing.
Are you talking about the article titled "Nuclear scandal - Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan" by Simon Henderson?

Similar news was reported by journalist Shyam Bhatia. Anyway, this shows the real culprits are the Chinese. Don't you think?

Prasun K Sengupta said...

^^^
Yes I am. And indeed the Chinese are the real culprits here. But China never broke any law by helping Pakistan or Iran as at that time China never signed the NPT. It did so only in 1998. Therefore, by the same token, India and Israel can legally cooperate in nuclear weapons co-development since both countries have not yet signed on to the NPT.

Anonymous said...

Prasun does Indian army have any plans for the replacement of INSAS for a better more modern assault rifle and what are your opinions on new pakistani rifle pk8?

3dB said...
This comment has been removed by the author.
Prasun K Sengupta said...

To autoTrack": Here are my responses:
1) The FD-2000 is not the HQ-9. The FD-2000 is as anti-radiation SAM.
2) The term 'HT-233' is no longer in use. The TER is the H-200. The YLC-2V (or something similar from NRIET) is the TAR. The SJ-231 is another vehicle that performs command and control functions. The designations were changed three years ago AFTER the HQ-9 began entering service.
3) You're right. Randomness in space implies random progression through all beams in the search volume. And randomness in time implies target track update rates.
Regards.

smith said...

Check out
http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/attachment.php?attachmentid=81701&d=1253540198

smith said...

Hi,

pakistan learnt there hard lesons in swat operation while using tanks against terrorists.

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/attachment.php?attachmentid=81698&d=1253540198

Unknown said...

Will India be procuring Rafael's Spice bomb conversion kits?

sbm said...

Prasun, your views appreciated - you know I appreciate all feedback:

Part 1
In the mid-1980s the first weapons were assembled. Sundarji knew of them. By 1987-88 (Brasstacks time) there was the first move to mount weapons on aircraft. The Mig-23/-27 and Jaguar were all considered.

The weight of the device was limited by the ability of the platform's centre pylon to carry a certain mass and the ground clearance.

The weight of the nuclear weapon selected - arming mechanisms, casings, fins, fuze/ retardation configuration included - selected came in at about 450-550kg (perhaps less) but with minimal ground clearance - lack of coordination between DRDO/BARC and the IAF being responsible. Revisions were of course made.

Though by 1993-94 the Jaguar had been superceeded by the Mirage 2000, for years it was the primary option.

At all stages the IAF knew the following:

(a) The number of weapons
(b) Their yield
(c) Their weight.

Of the following questions, I asked each and every one of them to an IAF Air Marshal, now retired who answered in the affirmative. The IAF knew a great deal more than the Indian army about India's weaponization in the 1980s and into the 1990s.

At that time yields of 15kT were the ones spoken of, but realistically 25KT is very much possible. Note however, that all the discussions I had referred specifically to operational 15KT weapons. I don't think a quibble about 15-25KT is going to be a big deal.

George Perkovich, writing in India's Nuclear Bomb at page 242 describes a 1982-83 upgrade of the POK-1 device weighing 170-200kg and also mentions a FBF design being readied for testing at this time.

This 170-200kg design is very important as it dovetails in with a statement made by Karnad at page 82 of his book India's Nuclear Policy where he states:

"India also has the 300km Brahmos supersonic cruise missile (SCM), produced with Russian collaboration and can deliver a conventional warhead. A 20KT fission weapon is being specifically designed for it by BARC..."

This would tie-in with my consistent comments that 700-1000kg is excessive for a 20-25KT Indian fission warhead. Given that the Brahmos payload is 300kg, Perkovich may well be correct.

sbm said...

Part 2
To add to the story, in 1996-98, prior to the tests but around the time of the Su-30MKI purchase, the MKI was selected in part because its centreline pylon was to be used at some point for a stand-off nuclear cruise missile.

Note where the air-launched Brahmos is ending up at present ?

Hammerblow IV was an IAF exercise in which a nuclear backdrop was factored in and the IAF demonstrated toss-bombing techniques: note that such techniques are not unique to nuclear strike and the MiG-23BNs involved were aiming at a heavily defended installation. The technique, however, it not an easy one to master so training pilots to do it does show an ability to delivery nuclear weapons in that way (the aim being to escape the blast).

During the period 1993 to 1999, the missile deterrent existed largely in potentia.

The Prithvi entered low-level production in 1993 with a rate as low as 10 per year but has now reached a total of between 180 and 200.

The Agni-TD was "operationalised" after a fashion with a few of them being around "just in case". None of these weapons were transfered to the armed forces.

The 1999 test of the Agni-2 was the first step towards a missile based deterrent. During the Kargil war, however, though 1-3 Agni-2 prototypes and perhaps 4 Prithvis were operationalised as a missile based deterrent in the event of a Pakistani strike. This was essentially a DRDO/BARC contingency force rather than a fully operational deterrent.

In the period 1998-99, however, Defense News reported that some 20 Agni missiles existed. I think that highly unlikely. The figure for Agni-2 was at best 3 and Agni-TD, 4.

I will not go into the story of the slow deployment and production of the Agni-1 and Agni-2.

sbm said...

Part 3:

Back to the central nuclear weapons story.

In 1996 when I started probing into weapons capability, BARC was very clear that it saw itself being able to produce fission or boosted-fission weapons if needed without the need for a dynamic test.

In 1996, despite Rao's moves in 1995, BARC was convinced that no Government would give a go-ahead for the dynamic testing of anything.

In 1998, what were tested - sub-kts aside (which were intended for simulations and probably to assess the use of reactor-grade plutonium) - were intended to - according to my sources:
(a) Validate the stockpiled weapons
(b) To develop a core design for a TN device while validating FBF technology which could be stretched to produce a variety of weapon designs without recourse to another test.

At all times, BARC wanted a series of 9 tests but realised that there were going to be political ramifications that would not allow another round of tests.

I have no real indication as to what S6 was so I will not speculate. Please note that the designations of S-1 etc are what we are using and have no official validation.

Regarding the weight of S-1, Raj, please see my reference to Test Simon of 1953 in Nevada to see an 11000lb TN 43kt test. The device was designed as a lead in to a much larger weapon - I think that would account for its weight. Similarly S1's 450kg should be considered in that light. The actual weapon designed to emerge may be lighter, heavier or something similar.

I am not going to debate yields. I agree with Iyengar's position that more tests are necessary and I am in absolute agreement with Srinivasan's analysis in respect of India's fission, boosted-fission and TN capability:
(per page 68 of Karnad's nuclear policy)

"According to Srinivasan, without more tests, the reliability of the 20kt fission weapon is "100%" of the tritium boosted design -"It will surely work... But the full performance of the booster part will be subject to less than 100% surety; [and] in the case of the full thermonuclear device the confidence level will perhaps be less.""

2002 was the watershed year for the military and nuclear weapons.

The Agni-1 had been tested, Agni-2 had entered LSP and the army - angling for control of these weapons - asked a direct question of BARC and DRDO regarding the status of the deterrent. Over a period of 48 hrs. Gen. Padmanabhan came to understand concerns over the TN weapon. He was told that BARC could not give a 100% yield assurance but that the TN capability was there.

This was also the period when DRDO and BARC began getting their own act together:

Quoting from Karnad's India's Nuclear Policy:

(at page 82) "Until 2002-2003 the high firewalls between the nuclear weapons design program and ASL prevented the optimization of nuclear missile design. Now there is very close cooperation. Thus, for example, S.K. Sikka, as head of the thermonuclear weapons project was asked to change the size parameters of a weapon for a certain Agni missile by a mere 5cm to exactly fit the missile configuration -because changing the missile size would require massive redesign and development work resulting in a delay of 3-4 years. After some quick calculations, Sikka readily agreed to chance the dimensions of the weapon in question. This level of cooperation is a great improvement on what existed when R. Chidambaram headed AEC."

At that point, there was a very conscious move not to rely on TN technology and to actively rely on the fission and boosted-fission technology available.

sbm said...

Part 4:

Scalability of these weapons is not easy, but it can be done and the devices so made would be more reliable than those on TN technology at this stage.

What is India's capability in this regard ? Fission technology - if one is willing to pay a weight and fissile material penalty - can be realistically scaled to 60-80KT in the Indian context with weapons immune from pre-detonation problems. Anything larger than that - problems can emerge (the 120kT French MR31 and the monstrous 500kT US Mk.18).

Would you want to test this again ? Sure. But the core fission technology has been mastered.

As far as FBF weapons are concerned, the largest one deployed gave a yield of 500kT.

Can India scale the FBF primary of S1 (assuming it was 17kT and worked properly) to 500KT ? No.

Can India scale such a weapon to 100-200kT ? Yes.

Would such a weapon be 100% reliable without testing ? No.

It would also be very bulky and weigh between 750-1000kg - you notice how this figure keeps recurring (Agni-2 payload etc) ?

See Srinivasan's comments which I posted earlier.

With FBF, something will work, but the efficacy of the boosting will at this stage be subject to less than 100% surety.

Can Indian scale its FBF to 60-80kT ? Yes - with probably a greater degree of reliablity and certainly enough to be acceptable.

With respect to the TN design - without going into the yields - the question comes down to this:

Whatever happened with S-1, can BARC weaponize a TN weapon that will work without further testing ?

The answer I keep getting is "probably".

Have they done it ? "Possibly".

I also note Chidambaram's words to the effect that BARC has been continuously working on things over the last 11 years. To assume things are static is dangerous. Indeed, Karnad at page 71 of India's Nuclear Policy states that:

"There are over 12 untested weapons designs, encompassing nuclear and thermonuclear gravity and glide bomb and warheads optimize for delivery by aircraft, land based cruise and ballistic missiles and ship and submarine-launched cruise and ballistic missiles on the shelf."

The most conservative of these designs could be viable with out dynamic testing - the most ambitious would be a gamble.

sbm said...

Part 5:
Regarding TN weaponization, I would say "weaponization" is a strangely undefined word.

Does it mean a fabricated device that is ready to be either tested or mated to a delivery system ?

Or does it mean a fabricated device that is ready to be handed over to the user with the designers giving an assurance of its viability ?

If it is the latter, I do not believe it has been done for any Indian TN device. The former, probably yes.

Where does this magic 200kT figure come from ?

It was intended that the S-1 device provide the basis for a weapon up to a "maximum-minimium" 200kT yield.

It was also intended that a contingency 150-200kT FBF be prepared in the event of the TN not working to specifications.

Does India have the capability to make a 200KT TN weapon ? Yes.

Has it made such a weapon ? Probably.

Is it 100% certain it will work to specifications ? No.

Is the SFC satisfied with that ? Not yet.

Is it deployed ? No.

Does India have the capability to make a 200kT FBF weapon ? Yes

Has it done so ? Probably

Is it 100% certain that it will work to specifications ? No.

Is the SFC satisfied ? More than with the TN

Is it deployed ? Probably not yet.

What we do know is that the Agnis are being deployed with payloads between 700 and 1000kg.

We also know that whatever is being said, the 20KT fission weapon - if it can fit on Brahmos - weighs under 300kg.

Therefore whatever is carried on the Agnis is over 20KT and weighs between 700 and 1000kg (say between 500kg and 750kg to cater for decoys etc.).

India's SFC has tailored its requirements and its planning around what is reliably available.

Such a capability is known and understood by the SFC and the GOI - hence Adm. Mehta's statement which is very conservative:

"We are a nation which maintains a credible deterrent...more than enough to deter anybody,'' said Admiral Mehta. And should someone do the unthinkable by launching a first-strike, then the "consequences will be more than what they can bear...[url]As far as we are concerned, scientists have given us a certain capability which is enough to provide requisite deterrence...the deterrent is tried and tested[/url].''

Air Marshal Ajit Bhavnani's words to Karnad also speak of greater synergy between the political establishment and the SFC(page 99 of India's Nuclear Policy):

"It has been time consuming for the political bosses to understand what's a de-mate situation, what's a mated situation, why we should have a mated situation and when a de-mated situation...But once they were made to understand, we are now in a good situation."

Anonymous said...

I feel that readers are waiting for a sensational article from you. Even not many people are posting their comments. It is time for new post from you, Prashun da.

Anyway, I have a question. Even though Gripen is the cutest and cheapest MRCA contender, there are a few things which IAF feel is not worthy for it. So what makes Gripen a good competitor? Why did IAF invited Gripen for the competition?

Anonymous said...

^^^
Mistake. Why did IAF invite Gripen?
Previous Anonymous.

Prasun K Sengupta said...

To Anon@10:44AM: Am working on it, and will upload it by tomorrow. It is about the Sino-Indian Standoff and believe me, a lot of the myths and disinformation floating around in other blogs will be busted, once and for all. Now, what makes you think the Gripen IN is the cheapest? Its sunken R & D costs have yet to be recovered by Saab/Gripen Int'l. The only M-MRCA contender whose R & D costs have been fully recovered thus far is the F-16 (and followed by the Super Hornet), and therefore the F-16IN Super Viper is the cheapest, most hi-tech and in my view, the cutest. And mind you, the Tejas Mk2 will be M-MRCA as well. No one is using the term 'LCA' anymore. I had already mentioned this at BROADSWORD and so far I haven't had any factual rebuttal from anyone thus far. In addition, no one is prepared to stick his/her neck out and convincingly explain how will the IAF reconcile the induction of two fourth-generation M-MRCAs (the imported one and the Tejas Mk2) starting 2012, and the FGFA starting 2015. Even BROADSWORD gives an oversimplistic response, saying since the Tejas is called LCA it will obviously be less capable than aircraft like the MiG-29K! Well, I wish the world was as uncomplicated as it is being made out to be!

To Nava: The Spice PGM family along with Python-5 and Derby is on offer along with the Gripen IN, and will probably be on board the to-be-upgraded IAF Jaguar IS as well.

Prasun K Sengupta said...

TO SBM: Sanjay, let me share with you what I know from my 'sources'.
1) Sometime in 1984 work began in BARC to design components for a thermonuclear device.
2) No modified 'EMP-hardened' airborne platform was available for India to deliver any kind of nuclear weapon until 1995. I know this for a fact simply because I was involved from a 'military-industrial' standpoint between 1989 and 1994 with the project to EMP-harden four Mirage 2000THs. I'll leave it at that without delving into further details. The idea then was to enable the Mirage 2000TH to cvarry a single gravity n-bomb. There were no payload limitations at all.
3) The BrahMos can never be modified in any manner to carry any kind of nuclear warhead NOT because of technological limitations, but because of Russia's NPT commitments. BrahMos Aerospace, the OEM, is and will always remain a 51%-49% India-Russia joint venture, and India will not be allowed to buy out the Russian shareholding.
4) The air-delivered munition (ADM) to be equipped with a unitary tactical n-warhead is being jointly developed by India and Israel. The ADM will be delivered by the Su-30MKI. Interestingly, after the SFC blessed this project in favour of the IAF, the Navy too joined the bandwagon as it too wanted such a weapon, albeit submarine-launched.
5) No Su-30MKIs have been EMP-hardened as yet. That work will begin only early next year when two Su-30MKIs will sent airlifted to IRKUT Corp in Irkutsk where the airframes will be zero-lifed, modified and strengthened to each carry a solitary BrahMos or ADM (meaning the ADM's weight will not exceed that of the air-launched BrahMos).
6) I'm told the S-6 was a boosted-fission warhead in its operational configuration (i.e. not a mere device) that could be mated with both the then existing Prithvi and the projected Agni-1.

sbm said...

Was S6 deemed to be a successful design?

I appreciate your views on my thoughts and your inputs.

WRT Brahmos - not talking about anything official (take 10 of them, open them up and play with warhead!).

However, what of my other comments on weights/yields and overall capabilities ?

Prasun K Sengupta said...

To SBM: Yes, S-6 was proven beyond doubt to be an already confirmed success. No need to tinker with the BrahMos as the ADM will be a far better option with far greater cruise range. Your educated estimations on weights/yields and overall capabilities are fairly balanced and credible. Also, confidence in Up-scaling boosted-fission and tactical warheads remains extremely high (this is what Dr Kakodkar was referring to with regard to relying on computer simulations). In fact, confidence in unitary tactical n-warheads is 'extremely' high and it was because of this very factor that co-development of the ADM and its vertically-launched submarine-carrying variant was taken up in late 2005.

sbm said...

Prasun thank you for your comments and your input.

By tactical nuke - up to what yield is feasible ? I take it you're using tactical to describe a fission weapon.

Prasun K Sengupta said...

To Nava: What's your 'humble but educated' take on NPT non-adherents like India and Israel co-developing cruise missile-delivered tactical n-warheads? Also, have you heard about a new lightweight version of the L-band EL/M-2083) aerostat-mounted radar being developed by ELTA Systems? I'm told it makes use of the scalable antenna of the naval S-band EL/M-2238 radar, and is now being modified (to cater to strong wind conditions) for use in high-altitude areas for providing clutter-free airspace surveillance over air bases located in valleys or plateaux 10,000 feet above sea level.

Prasun K Sengupta said...

To SBM: yes, fission-based warheads for use in battlefields against heavy troop concentrations. Yields of 12 to 17kT should be more than enough.

sbm said...

However, can't the same fission weapon/design be scaled up to 50KT or so making it a sub-strategic weapon for India ?

Do you think such a weapon can be reliably done in India ?

I ask this because K. Subramanyam made the comment that 60-80kt fission weapons had been fabricated.

He knows the difference between boosted-fission etc. That is quite a statement from him.

sbm said...

One other thing - do you know if India has any 2-axis radiographic hydrodynamic facility ?

Prasun K Sengupta said...

To SBM: Of course. That capability was put to test back in May 1998 and it went bang as expected. As for DARHT, yes it has been in existence since 2002.

sbm said...

Prasun, you ever thought of going into teaching ?

The DAHRT facility I take it is operational at BARC or is it at the IGARC ?

Prasun K Sengupta said...

To SBM: It is in Trombay. Thought that's what I was doing (sharing with others whatever I've learnt or partaken in thus far n life) by maintaining the blog and replying to as many queries as possible. To me it is a moral obligation to post as many replies as possible. If not, then to me, maintaining a blog like this is useless. What in fact gladens me enormously is to see so many fellow bloggers asking not only well-meaning questions, but also seek clarifications on not only what has already been stated, but also on what's often not stated. For, as is often the case, the devil always lurks within the details and therefore remains largely invisible. You will get a first-hand taste of this as soon as I've finished drafting the piece on the current Sino-Indian standoff.
Very best wishes.

sbm said...

I for one am grateful.

Prasun K Sengupta said...

To SBM: The feeling's mutual.

Millard Keyes said...

You said you feel the moral obligations to answer as many queries. Well you missed mine about the so called "radar evading" coating developed to apply on IAF planes.I have not heard a single article since its publication so don't know this is real or not.Also when are the off the shelf Su30MKIs due from Irkut?I am also not sure why India declined to buy the used Mirage 2000-5s from Qatar instead of this MMRCA competition, await FGA development and complement the forces with more SU-30 MKI and retire the flying coffins or keep a few for trainers.Would have saved money and maintained strength.Honestly, with Mig 21s being the primary aircraft in the IAF, with Mirage 2000, Mig 29, Jaguar all awaiting upgrade plus not enough submarines, no artillery, dodgy rifles...I can't understand how the lives of 1million plus armed service personnel are put at risk along with the entire fate of the nation!

F said...

Prasun, is it true that the IN in the late 90's, decided to integrate the SM-39 Exocet on its Type 209s but the project was abandoned due to French reluctance?

You mentioned that the IN's future Scorpene fleet will be able to embark a DSRV should the need arise. What about those of Chile and the RMN? As always, thank you.

Unknown said...

WRT to the Elta radar, I hadn't heard of it. But if there's an operational requirement, then by all means... I'm more interested however in the general question of where the "radar world" is going. Now that AESAs are relatively commonplace, what's going to be the next game changer?...

(BTW, you claim that Barak 8 will utilize an AESA active radar seeker. Do you know of any other missiles that will feature one?)

WRT to the ADM, it certainly signifies the strength of Indo-Israeli relations. I don't really see why India would need it, but Israel certainly does.

Prasun K Sengupta said...

To Pierre Zorin: The first RAM paints were developed by the late 1990s by DRDO for applications on both warships and combat aircraft. Then came the following:
Materials scientists at the Indian Institute of Technology in Roorkee (IIT-R) have developed microwave absorbing nanocomposite coatings that could make aircraft almost invisible to radar. The technology for building invisible, or stealth aircraft, is a closely guarded secret of developed countries and a handful of laboratories in India are doing research in this area. Radars that emit pulses of microwave radiation identify flying aircraft by detecting the radiation reflected by the aircraft's metallic body. The nanocomposite coatings developed by Rahul Sharma, R.C. Agarwala and Vijaya Agarwala at IIT-R absorb most of the incident radiation and reflect very little. Sharma, who revealed his team's work at an international nanomaterials conference held recently at the Indian Institute of Science here, believes their nano-product is a significant step in developing a technology to enable aircraft escape radar surveillance and protect its equipment from electronic "jamming". Nanoparticles--so called because of their very small size--are known to exhibit unique physical and chemical properties. The IIT team found that crystals of "barium hexaferrite" with particle size of 10-15 nanometres have the ability to absorb microwaves. (Human hair, for comparison, is 100,000 nanometres thick). They developed special processes for synthesizing the nanopowder and formulating it as a coating. Sharma said that the nanocomposite coating on the aluminium sheet absorbed 89 percent of incident microwaves at 15 giga hertz - the frequency normally used by radars--reflecting only 11 percent. A stealth aircraft should ideally absorb all the incident radiation and reflect nothing. "Even a country like Russia could not achieve this so far," said Prof R.C. Agarwala of Metallurgical and Materials Engineering, who led the project. Prof Agarwala, who is known to be the first in the country to work on nanotechnology for materials development, started work on the radar-absorbing nano crystals in 1998.
www. teluguportal.net, November 7, 2006

I had also posted months earlier some data (first reported by INDIAN EXPRESS) on gold-coated cockpit canopy and its treatment technology that has been perfected by a Kolkata-based institute. The Su-30MKIs will be delivered by IRKUT Corp within 12 months of contract signature.

Prasun K Sengupta said...

To Nava: In future the game-changers will not be platform-centric, but network-centric. As for active radar seekers for MR-SAMs and LR-SAMs, the US Standard 3 family of SAMs will have it, as will the projected Russian S-500. Regarding the ADM India in late 1998 officially declared its requirement for deploying a triad of n-weapons, i.e. land-launched, submarine-launched and air-launched. Nothing surprising about it.

To Faris: No, the IN had no intention of deploying the SM-39 on the Class 209/Type 1500 SSKs. As for DSRVs, any DSRV built to NATO specs will be compatible with any SSK built by a NATO member-state, as both platforms will have compatible docking mechanisms. But SSKs do not normally carry DSRVs. The DSRVs are carried by vessels called submarine depot ships for rescue operations.

Unknown said...

SM-3 isn't an SAM; it's an ABM missile. And I understand that India requires such a missile in the formal sense, but why does it really need them? Also Net Centricity is such a slippery concept... it's really about computing power more than anything else.

Prasun K Sengupta said...

To Nava: How do you distinguish between 'formal sense' and 'really'? To me either there is an operational reqmt or there isn't, so can you please be specific?

Unknown said...

Israel can declare that it requires 5 aircraft carriers. Does it in your opinion objectively need them, will procuring them be a wise way for it to spend its money? That's what I mean...

Also I don't think the SM-3 is supposed to have an active radar seeker at all. You might have meant the SM-6, but it will also only have the AMRAAM D's active seeker,which doesn't seem to be an AESA.

Prasun K Sengupta said...

To Nava: I still don't get you. I can't understand where this 'can' is coming from. If there is an operational requirement for inducting into service in Israel or India SAMs like the Barak-8 or Barak-8ER, then such missiles will be procured and inducted into service, unless you 'personally' think such hardware is not required for any operational commander. And no objective IDF commander will ever ask for five aircraft carrier-based battle groups, that I'm sure of.
Regarding the SM-3 family, the missiles still have growth potential (in terms of upscaling of capabilities) and in response to emerging threats I'm certain the appropriate technologies, whenever they achieve maturity, will be incorporated into the missile.

Unknown said...

Wow. I'm asking for YOUR opinion! I understand that the Indian government might beg to differ. I PERSONALLY don't see the need for India to invest heavily in Nuclear detterence, and would have preferred if the money were spent on irregular warfare compatible equipment. Obviously the aircraft carrier was just an over the top example. WRT the SM-3, I doubt it. IIR seekers seem to be the norm for exo atmospheric interceptors. Are you on terra firma claiming that Barak 8 will have an AESA seeker?

Prasun K Sengupta said...

Nava, if you wanted a straight answer I would have given it you much earlier if only a straight and direct question would have been forthcoming, such as: why does India require SAMs like the Barak-8 or Barak-8ER?; or what are India's threat perceptions with regard to hostile airpower intentions/capabilities? Instead of that you went of to 'really' or 'can'. That's what baffled me, as I'm pretty sure (like the Govt of India) that MR-SAMs and LR-SAMs are reqd by India not for flaunting them at national parades, but for ensuring the credibility of the country's defensive airpower capabilities.
As for India investing 'heavily' on nuclear deterrence, I don't know where this 'heavily' description is coming from, as the investments reqd for ensuring a credible n-deterrence posture based on a triad of deployed arsenal, which by the way will not number in the 100s, but in several tens. What also needs to be understood is that India's nuclear capabilities are not weapons-centric. Instead, India has since the 1950s built by a huge nuclear industrial infrastructure primarily to cater to civilian nuclear energy generation. Therefore, indulging in 'downstream' activities like developing nuclear weapons and their support/command-and-control infrastructure does not even boil down to 4% of the annual expenditure of India's Dept of Atomic Energy.
As fpr the Barak-8's AESA-based terminal guidance system, I'm not on terra firma, but on terra reinforced-concrete. Clear enough? (LoL!)

Prasun K Sengupta said...

To Nava: Just out of curiosity,what exactly are the kind of irreguler warfare equipment/capabilities you have in mind that would ensure dissuasive deterrence against the threat posed by a neighbour armed with 1-megaton thermonuclear warheads?

Unknown said...

I never asked about India's requirement for the Barak 8! I asked about the ADM specifically. The only thing I wanted to know was whether you could back up the claim that Barak 8 had an AESA seeker (mentioning other systems with such seekers would've helped).

A country as big as India doesn't really need an air delivered Nuke. It's far to big for all its land based BMs to be destroyed. And there's really no chance that china or Pakistan's government (not militias) would attack India nuclearly. The biggest threat to India is Pakistan based terrorist organizations. Therefor I would suggest they buy tactical UAVs in the thousands, C4I systems for infantry, much more survivable armored vehicles etc. before spending money on yet another way to bring about world war 3 :)

Prasun K Sengupta said...

To Nava: Well, you're entitled to your opinions about the perceived threats to India and I for one won't argue with you, but just say that an overwhelming proportion of Indian intelligensia and the country's civilian/military decision-makers will totally disagree with you. In terms of existential threats to India and it has always been and will be from China. As for whether or not there will ever be all-out nuclear war between China and India, the answer is a firm NO as of May 11, 1998 because overt n-deterrence vis-a-vis China was formally proclaimed by India on that day. As for survivability of a country's nuclear deterrent, it is an established reality that only a submarine-based n-arsenal offers the highest degree of survivability and proportionally, as a consequence of this, the majority of deployed n-warheads of France, Russia, the US and the UK are on board SSBNs. Land-mobile ballistic or cruise missiles do not have the degree of survivability (of a nuclear first-strike) as SLBMs and SLCMs do. Therefore, investing in such arsenals is just about the only way to avoid WW-3 (as a credible deterrence posture is but a mind game). As for buying thousands of tactical/mini/micro UAVs go, that process began way back in 1999.

Unknown said...

By all means, deploy hundreds of nukes. But why should they be air launched? If the ADM were conventional, I'd be all for. But for nuclear confrontation, it's superfluous.

Prasun K Sengupta said...

To Nava: No one's talking about India deploying n-weapons by the hundreds. And why air-launched? I'm sure the strategic targeteers of India's Strategic Forces Command and their Israeli counterparts had several rounds of 'enlightened' deliberations before deciding to embark on the project. Therefore, what you or I may feel or opine about the ADM and its SLCM variant is, to put it simply, intellectually and operationally futile and totally uncalled for. Need a second opinion on the efficacy of ADMs? Check out the n-weapons delivery platforms of the US, Russia, France and China.

Millard Keyes said...

Many thanks Prasun.By the way what was the new year greeting about?whose new year?

Divakar said...

Prasun,

Eaqgerly waiting for your next post on the ind-chn issue and checking trishul 4 times a day.

Thanks

Prasun K Sengupta said...

To Pierre Zorin: For the Jews and Muslims.

To Divakar: Feverishly working on it. You won't be disappointed.

sbm said...

Prasun - here's a couple of hypothetical questions:

(1) If India should resume nuclear testing - will the TN be successful ?

(2) In the event of such tests could the armed forces conventional capability be maintained and/or enhanced in the face of the sanctions that will follow ?

I have no doubts about the Indian economy - if it can survive the bureaucracy, corruption and inefficiency that exists now - it can survive and thrive in any circumstance.

Prasun K Sengupta said...

Sanjay, as much as I, like you, would like to see a fully validated and credible thermonuclear weapon being developed for India, I'm increasingly inclined to believe that the country's higher decision-making process has already gone into overdrive to ensure that the existing de facto moratoriuum on n-testing is converted into a permanent de jure status. Personally, therefore I do not see any further prospect of a future round of n-weapons tests. Further proof of my personal assertion can be found here:
http://www.frontlineonnet.com/stories/20091009262003800.htm

sbm said...

I wholeheartedly agree with you.

However, I am considering the hypothetical situation.

On nuclear issues, the GOI has traditionally been very sane. Any reason for the course they are taking ?

sbm said...

Sikka has done a pretty good job in that frontline article as did Chidambaram and Kakodkar at the press conference.

Sure S-1 may not have done perfectly but there are a number of factors the detractors have not come to terms with.

Prasun K Sengupta said...

My dear Sanjay, if sanity would have prevailed, then India would have weaponised between May 1974 and 1978 and would have long ago been a party to the NPT as a declared and recognised nuclear weapons state (as now revealed by Dr Henry Kissinger's memoirs). Only the insane could have imposed a self-imposed moratorium between May 1974 and May 1998! Had sanity prevailed, India as a declared nuclear weapons state by 1978 could now have joined the bandwagon and along with the US could have engaged in the on-going bleeding moralistic tamasha calling for universal nuclear disarmament (not elimination, mind you). Instead, now India is left with no other alternative but to beg the US and France for the simulation models reqd for sub-critical testing of n-devices and which by the way may not come at all as the P-5 wants India to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state. Therefore, thanks to utter lack of strategic visioning since the 1970s have now pushed these civilian decision-makers into a corner and claim that n-deterrence is just a mind-game rather than being a demonstrated and credible deterrent built upon the foundation of mutually assured destruction doctrine.

sbm said...

Unrealistic - fissile material production from CIRUS was too low to allow for proper weaponization.

In 1978, if everything worked, India might have had 10-12 fission weapons if no more tests had been done.

The capacity building started in the 1980s. If you say that testing in 1988 would have brought the benefits - I agree.

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