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The Akash E-SHORADS surface-to-air missile (SAM), developed by India’s Kanchanbagh-based Defence Research & Development Laboratory (DRDL), officially has no takers as yet. The Akash’s R & D project has been in existence for the past 20 years. Originally slated for completion within a 12-year period, the project’s Rs5 billion R & D phase had to extended by another eight years due to previously unforeseen technological and operational challenges, especially with regard to its fire-control and missile guidance systems. When the project took off in the late 1980s, the DRDL had proudly claimed that target engagement will be undertaken by the ground-based, active phased-array Rajendra L-band Battery-Level Radar (BLR) and a track-via-missile guidance system for the missile. However, the sheer technological challenges forced the DRDL to abandon this path by the mid-1990s, and the DRDO’s Bangalore-based Electronics R & D establishment (LRDE) instead took up the development of a passive phased-array variant of the Rajendra target engagement radar, whose laboratory version had 4,000 phase shifters, a spectrally pure travelling wave tube (TWT) transmitter (which at that time was imported from THALES Nederland), two-stage superheterodyne correlation receiver for three channels, a high-speed digital signal processor, real-time management computer, and a radar data processor. For the 25km-range missile the radio command-link guidance technique was adopted. It was this system that was until 2002 being proposed an all weather area air defence system for defending vulnerable areas (VA) and vulnerable points (VP) against manned airborne targets approaching from medium and high altitudes. The system has been designed to neutralise multiple airborne targets attacking from several directions simultaneously, and is fully autonomous in terms of its operation. The Akash E-SHORADS is now being offered in two versions: one whose launcher is mounted on the hull of a T-72M main battle tank (for the Indian Army), and another mounted on a cross-country truck built by TATA Motors, this being for the Indian Air Force (IAF). When deployed, the Akash comprises a network of early warning, tracking, and engagement radars and fire-direction control centres, all functioning in a network-centric manner. The system has advanced battlefield management software, which carries out relative threat computation and pairing of targets and missiles and missile fire-control. Dr R R Panyam has been the Project Director for Akash since 2002. About 1,000 scientists from 13 DRDO laboratories have contributed thus far to the Akash’s R & D effort.
During a series of test-firings in realistic desert terrain combat conditions last December, the complete Akash Weapon System was fielded and its mobility assessed. The user trials of intercepting unmanned flying targets were conducted between December 14 and 21, during which the Akash successfully intercepted its targets five times in a row in this campaign. The fifth and last trial successfully took place at 2.15pm on December 21 during which one missile destroyed a manoeuvring, turbojet-powered Lakshya aerial target drone. The ten-day long user’s trials saw the participation of 300 officials from the DRDO, DPSUs, and private industries. Dr Prahlada, who conceptualised the Akash Weapon System and headed the project for nearly for two decades and is currently the Chief Controller for R & D (Missiles) at DRDO HQ, provided the leadership during the recent test-firing campaign. In the aftermath of these trials, the following observations from the end-users’ perspectives are noteworthy:
1) By the time mobility trials of the Akash’s Army variant were conducted at Pokhran between June 11 and 29 last year, followed by flyover trials as part of the IAF-specific variant’s firing trials at Pokhran between November 15 and 17, and systems performance trials of the IAF-specific variant conducted at the Chandipur-on-sea-based Interim Test Range (ITR) near Balasore between December 14 and 21 last year, it emerged that while the Akash had the systems configuration and logistics tail of a medium-range SAM, it terms of mission effectiveness, it was no better than an enhanced short-range air defence system (E-SHORADS).
2) The missile’s engagement range of 25km has since early 2003 been viewed has highly deficient by both the IAF and the Indian Army, both of which have since insisted on a minimum range of 40km (and preferably 50km) if indeed the Akash is to be employed for protecting VAs and VPs against multiple attacks from cruise missiles. It is for this reason that both the Army and IAF have indicated that they will more likely opt for a land-based, road-mobile variant of the vertically-launched 70km-range Barak-2 SAM (using the S-band EL/M-2248 active phased-array radar for both target acquisition and engagement), unless the promised longer-range Akash Mk2 is made available as soon as possible. It is this factor that, according to the IAF and the Army, makes the Akash a financially unviable medium-range SAM when viewed from a techno-economic matrix. Therefore, unless the DRDL develops a 40km-range variant of the Akash, the system will have no takers, neither in India or abroad.
3) The Akash’s Battery-level configuration has not yet demonstrated its ability to simultaneously engage four airborne targets each with three missiles. Both the Army and the IAF are of the view that the Rajendra BLR, in order to ensure a 99.8% probability of successful target engagement against both manned combat aircraft and especially cruise missiles (to detect them, both the Army and Air Force are acquiring the ELTA Systems-built aerostat-mounted EL/M-2083 active phased-array radars), needs to morph into an AESA configuration, as opposed to its existing PESA design. Both the Army and IAF are of the view that it order to stay technologically relevant for combating future airborne threat scenarios, AESA-based target engagement radars are mandatory. The Army has also specified that such radars perform all search, identification, tracking, and engagement functions, instead of having three different radars for all functions ranging from target detection to tracking to engagement.
To address these requirements, the DRDL has already initiated R & D work on the Mk2 variant of the Akash missile, which will make use of a newer, higher-energy HTPB-based composite booster propellant housed within a slightly lengthened booster section. Its fuel-rich sustainer propellant, based on magnesium/sodium nitrate/naphthalene processed by pressure-moulding techniques, will remain the same. The Rajendra BLR’s modular AESA variant now being fabricated will include a carbon-fibre cover in front of the antenna array, RF distribution network, and about 80 transmit/receive modules (using hybrid MICs and MMICs for transmit and receive chains) that will be air-cooled. Each such module will comprise a power amplifier for the transmitted microwave signal, low-noise amplifiers as front-ends for the receiver channels, and phase shifters for accurate control of the signal phase in both transmit and receive modes. In the latter, amplification of the signal will be controlled as well. The phases and amplitudes will be continuously calibrated. Each T/R module will be connected to one vertical slotted waveguide. The technology for miniaturisation and mass industrial production of the T/R modules is believed to have been obtained from ELTA Systems since 1998, with the Indian recipients of such technologies being Astra Microwave Products Ltd, BEL and ECIL. Incidentally, such T/R modules were originally developed for the LRDE-developed long-range tracking radar (LRTR), whose design and performance parameters bear more than a close resemblance to the EL/M-2080 ground-based active phased-array L-band long-range tracking radar, two of which were supplied in late 2001 under a US$50 million order placed by the DRDO with the ELTA Systems Group subsidiary of Israel Aerospace Industries. For catering to the power supply requirements of the environmental control system of the Rajendra BLR’s AESA variant, the LRDE has selected Microturbo’s S20-G gas turbine-based APU, which weighs less than 80kg. It can easily be integrated into a compartment above the track passage of the T-72M. The S209-G runs on the same diesel fuel as the T-72M.—Prasun K. Sengupta
This is what best explains the four rounds of exhaustive field-trials conducted thus far by the Indian Army on a no-cost no-commitment basis (from 2002 to 2007) of the two 155mm/52-calibre towed howitzers—BAE Systems/SWS Defence’s FH-77BO5L52 and Soltam Systems’s ATHOS 2052. For it was during Operation Vijay in mid-1999 that made Army HQ realise the urgent need for not the towed howitzers, but truck-mounted, lightweight, motorised 155mm/52-calibre howitzers. In fact, by mid-July 1999, Army HQ was desperately seeking authorisation from the Cabinet Committee on National Security for inducting without any further delay about 60 G-6 155mm/45-calibre motorised howitzers from South Africa’s Denel Group. At the same time, Denel and the state-owned Bharat Earth Movers Ltd (BEML) teamed up to co-develop the Condor or the T-5, comprising Denel/LIW’s G-5 Mk2000 155mm/52-cal gun mounted on a BEML-assembled TATRA 8 x 8 vehicle. During the DEFEXPO 2000 expo, however, the Condor was not exhibited. The only motorised howitzer then displayed at the expo site was the ATMOS from Soltam Systems. Let us now briefly go back to late 1999 when the Army realised that, firstly, it was still possible to wage a limited conventional war even after the nuclearisation of South Asia, provided the adversary’s nuclear threshold was not violated; and secondly, such limited wars would not involve full-scale territorial conquests, but would instead involve the waging of parallel wars or hyper-wars aimed at seizing the operational initiative, engaging the adversary in detail, and severely degrading the enemy’s war-waging potential via a series of grinding wars of attrition where the side with superior manoeuvre war-waging capabilities, accompanied by decapitating massed fire-assaults directed and coordinated by superior network-centric battlespace surveillance systems, will be the ultimate winner.
This consequently, resulted in Army HQ deciding to acquire the required quantum of tube artillery-based firepower by a) seriously evaluating the prospects of acquiring up to 220 motorised 155mm/52-calibre howitzers by issuing Requests for Information (RFI); b) expediting the induction of 430 upgraded M-46S 155mm/45-cal towed howitzers (for 20 Regiments) that have since 2002 been supplied by the state-owned Ordnance Factories Board (OFB) under licence from Israel’s Soltam Systems (the M-46S is now the Army’s tube artillery system with the longest reach, being able to fire ERFB-BB rounds out to 38.5km and VLAP rounds out to 42km when using bi-modular charges); and c) issuing Requests for Proposals (RFP) in late 2000 for 1,580 towed autonomous 155mm/52-cal howitzers, for which only BAE Systems/SWS Defence’s (formerly Bofors AB) FH-77BO5L52, the Denel Group’s G-5 Mk2000 and Soltam’s ATHOS 2052 and the FH-2000 from Singapore’s ST Engineering responded and also sent their respective howitzers for competitive mobility and firepower evaluations/trials. France’s Nexter Systems (then GIAT Industries) and Spain’s Santa Barbara never took part in the competition as they were reportedly convinced that they would not enjoy a level playing field since, for political reasons, only the Israeli and South African offers would be taken seriously and shortlisted. While these evaluations/trials were close to being concluded, Operation Parakram was launched on December 17, 2001 that saw the biggest-ever wartime mobilisation of the Indian Army since 1971. It was during this mobilisation that Army HQ clearly realised that it was doctrinally prepared only to fight the last war (as rehearsed during Ex Brass Tacks in 1987), and not the next war. What does this mean?
In the mid-1980s, the Indian Army’s offensive warfighting doctrine had called for up to three Strike Corps (mobilised over a comfortable 30-day period in the build-up to hostilities) punching deep down into enemy territory in a lightning campaign characterised by overwhelming superiority in terms of armoured might, field artillery firepower, and combined arms warfare waged by mechanised/motorised infantry formations. In late 2001, however, the success of India’s coercive diplomacy depended entirely on the speed with which the Army could deploy and concentrate its forces in launch-pads along the country’s western borders. In this, the Indian Army clearly failed to score over its Pakistani counterpart in operational terms because it had to rely on external lines of communications (i.e. deploying from its peacetime locations deep within India’s hinterland to its staging areas) that resulted in a Strike Corps taking at least 17 days to be fully deployed and become combat-ready, and all three Strike Corps (I Corps with its 31st Armoured Division, II Corps with its 1st Armoured Division, and XXI Strike Corps with its 33rd Armoured Division) taking 30 days to be fully deployed, with two in Rajasthan and one in Punjab. Pakistan’s geography, on the other hand, ensured that all of the Pakistan Army’s armoured and mechanised infantry formations, using interior lines of communications, could launch offensive operations against India within 96 hours. It was this state of affairs that led to a standoff without any operational advantage to either side between January and March 2002, and the only way this was rectified by Army HQ, then under the bold and audacious leadership of COAS Gen ‘Paddy’ Padmanaban, was by redeploying the sole Strike Corps from Punjab into Rajasthan in April, thus resulting in all three of the Army’s Strike Corps being poised for offensive operations at their launch-pads across the Thar Desert, a scenario that had never before even been wargamed! In theory, this redeployment consequently resulted in the Holding Corps-level formations in Punjab and Jammu becoming vulnerable to a pulverizing strike from Pakistan’s armoured might, and was later rectified only by the redeployment of the Army’s strategic reserve formations--the 2nd, 3rd 6th, 14th, 16th and 23rd Independent Armoured Brigades, and the seven Independent Infantry Brigades—to Punjab and Jammu.
From the Indian armed forces’ perspective, the most important lessons that emerged from the OP Parakram standoff were two-fold: in future a lack of clarity within the Union Cabinet of the day on India’s overall war objectives may result in the country’s political leadership dithering till the last moment in issuing mobilization orders; and that being the case the armed forces had to come up with as new warfighting doctrine that would enable it to swiftly mobilize (within 72 hours) and retain the operational initiative by adopting a forward-deployed posture before the adversary can, and re-organise and re-equip both its Holding Corps-level formations with highly mobile Brigade-sized integrated offensive formations. Thus was born the so-called Cold Start Doctrine (now called Pro-Active Strategy), which was officially unveiled on April 28, 2004 by Army HQ. The most significant aim of this new doctrinal transformation is to strike offensively with eight Integrated Brigade Groups (IBG) without giving away any battle indicators of mobilization and thereby significantly reduce the reaction time and early warning normally available to Pakistan, and this in turn means that each such IBG will have to be forward deployed even in peacetime and have an ORBAT that puts an enormous premium on mobility and the ability to wage all-weather offensive operations simultaneously across eight sectors in a fluid battlespace without provoking the threat of a Pakistani nuclear response, but at the same time greatly dissipating the Pakistan Army’s defensive war-waging potential. The IBGs, now being raised by selectively merging the Army’s seven Independent Armoured Brigades and the seven Independent Infantry Brigades, were originally conceived by HQ Southern Command.
Which brings us back to the sad and unending saga towed field artillery howitzer trials. By late 2002 it was evident that the days of towed autonomous 155mm/52-cal howitzers were clearly numbered and therefore Army HQ decided to re-issue RFPs for such guns, but this time the number of units required was reduced from 1,580 to 400 (for five Regiments) worth US$663 million. This time, however, both ST Engineering and France’s Nexter Systems clearly smelt a rat and decided not to respond to the RFP. Both of them had by then received clear vibes from Army HQ that eventually the FH-77BO5L52 would be selected over Soltam’s ATHOS 2052, with the winner replacing the existing 410 FH-77BO2L39s and being able to fire ERFB-BB rounds out to 42.1km, and VLAP rounds out to 52.5km when using bi-modular charges. And as it turned out, during the unprecedented fourth round of trials, the FH-77BO5L52 prevailed over the ATHOS 2052 in terms of several critical reliability and performance parameters, one of which apparently included the amount of paint that would peel off the gun barrels due to sustained firing! So why is Army HQ now seeking the bizarre fifth round of firing trials? It is widely believed that if Army HQ could have its way, it would ideally like to totally do away with the acquisition of towed autonomous 155mm/52-cal howitzers and instead acquire an initial 180 airmobile 155mm/52-cal motorised howitzers, with up to 814 17-tonne motorised howitzers (for 35 Field Artillery Regiments), now known as Mounted Gun Systems, being acquired eventually. RFPs for this requirement, though, have yet to be issued. Another priority acquisition identified by Army HQ is for up to 120 airmobile ultra-lightweight 155mm/39-calibre howitzers that can be transported underslung by medium-lift helicopters. This type of howitzer is currently available from only two sources—BAE Systems’ LW-155 and ST Kinetics of Singapore’s Pegasus. This then leaves us with only two probable conclusions as to why Army HQ is now being made to dilute its GSQRs and seek a fifth round of competitive trials for towed autonomous 155mm/52-cal howitzers: either to accommodate a new competitor that has already been promised this contract by the Govt of India due to ‘extraneous’ reasons; or trying to wear out and eventually force BAE Systems/SWS Defence to unilaterally withdraw in sheer frustration, which will conveniently enable the present UPA coalition government to distance itself from the ‘ghost of Bofors’ at a time when general elections are around the corner. Small wonder, therefore, that BAE Systems has now refused to bid for the airmobile ultra-lightweight 155mm/39-calibre howitzer programme on ethical grounds—Prasun K. Sengupta
By the way, the IAF's existing IL-76MDs can also be subjected to a life-extension programme, can be re-engined, and can also be retrofitted with glass cockpits similar to the ones being proposed for the fleet of An-32B tactical transports.
Overall, it has been a mixed bag of success for the Indian Army’s Directorate of Field Artillery over the past decade. On one hand, it acquired strategic force multiplier capabilities (with rocket artillery assets) through its 333 (raised in June 1993 and commissioned in October 1995), 444 (raised in October 2003) and 555 Missile Groups (operational by January 2005), each equipped with a total of 60 liquid-fuelled, conventional warhead-armed, 150km-range surface-to-surface missiles, including reserve rounds) and is now raising its first of two Regiments of the 290km-range BrahMos supersonic, multi-role cruise missile (MRCM). The three Prithvi Missile Groups and the two BrahMos Regiments will form part of the ORBATs of the Indian Army’s two dedicated Artillery Divisions—40 and 41.
Each Prithvi Missile Group is made up of two Sub-Groups that in turn are made up of two Troops. Each Troop has two SS-150 mobile autonomous launchers (MAL). Thus, each Group has 8 launchers and almost 24 support vehicles, with the number of MALs expected to treble to 24 in future. However, in times of hostilities, the missiles will be pre-fuelled (the shelf-life of the liquid propellant is 10 years) before being deployed to their launch sites where only three vehicles—the MAL, power supply vehicle and one Mobile Command Post (MCP)—would be employed. The Prithvi SS-150—officially described by the DRDO as a tactical surface-to-surface missile and by the Army as a battlefield support missile--is fuelled by a liquid propellant (a 50:50 combination of isomeric xylidine and trimethlyamine), with the oxidizer being inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA). The propellant has a 260 specific impulse and was specified by the Army, which required a range fluctuation between 40km and 150km and this could only have been achieved by a variable total impulse best generated by liquid propellants. When it achieved operational status, the SS-150, equipped with a strap-down inertial navigation system, had a CEP of 300 metres, which is now being brought down to 30 metres through the adoption of a ring laser gyro-based inertial navigation system coupled to a GPS receiver utilising PY code. Warhead options for the SS-150 include the standard high-explosive unitary warhead (weighing 1,000kg), pre-fragmented, and cluster munitions, an incendiary warhead, and fuel air explosive. Following its launch, the SS-150’s semi-ballistic trajectory will take it to an altitude of 30km following which it will adopt either a steep ballistic trajectory at nearly 80 degrees, or a lift-augmented descent trajectory. As far as the latter option goes, there are six flight-path variations available (which are pre-programmed prior to launch) in order to defeat or confuse anti-ballistic missile defences. It is evident from all this that the SS-150 will, during, hostilities, be employed for massed but effects-based fire assaults against largely static targets like troop concentrations, plus railroad and POL junctions, this being done in order to severely degrade the hostile force’s theatre-level and strategic reserves before they could become effective in the forward tactical battle areas. However, there is currently one critical problem that prevents the SS-150 from being optimally employed: the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has not yet answered with clarity the question of whether the SS-150 will carry only conventional warheads or not. Consequently and strangely, the three SS-150 Missile groups remain under the administrative control only of the Army HQ’s Directorate of Field Artillery, but operational command-and-control over them is exercised only by the C-in-C of the Strategic Forces Command (SFC). It is this bizarre state of affairs that requires urgent rectification if the SS-150 is to be employed with devastating and decisive effect against any potential adversary. What has to be recognised is that the SS-150 never had and still has no strategic significance whatsoever as a deterrent in the nuclear context, and must therefore be allowed to become an integral part of the conventional ORBAT of operational theatre commanders, which will enable them to score over their opponents at the operational level.
As for the BrahMos MRCM, the Army plans to employ them for pin-point decapitating fire assaults against formational-level field HQs as well as pre-selected transportation nodes (of both external and interior lines of communications) and probable ballistic/cruise missile launch sites of the adversary. Each BrahMos Regiment will include three Batteries each with four MALs (each with three vertically-launched missiles), three MCPs, one Fixed Command Centre, nine missile replenishment vehicles, and three maintenance support vehicles, and will enable the Army to engage targets for its deep battles over a frontage of 600km. Each MAL carries three vertically-launched BrahMos missiles, and covers a frontage of 600km. The missile launcher’s launch beam is articulated to make the launch cannisters vertical through a high-pressure hydraulic system controlled by an electronic controller. The COTS-based launcher control system (LCS) functions in coordination with the MCP-mounted fire-control system (FCS) and a mast-mounted millimeter-wave line-of-sight secure communications system. Each MAL has a containerised power supply system consisting of 40kVA diesel generating set and 40kVA PTO alternator, a 2 x 7.5kVA single-phase UPS with integral battery bank for 15 minutes back-up power generation, and a 5kVA single-phase diesel generator. The BrahMos MRCM is 9 metres tall, weighs three metric tonnes, and carries a conventional 300kg warhead with 90kg TNT content. It has two stages—a solid propellant booster stage, and a ramjet-powered second stage using liquid propellant. Compared to existing subsonic cruise missiles, the BrahMos is superior by a factor of 3 in terms of velocity, 3 times better in flight range, 4 times better in terms of seeker range, and 9 times superior in terms of kill energy. Billed as a weapon unleashing technological asymmetry in the battlespace, this MRCM is capable of tilting the balance of war in favour of the possessor who can use it imaginatively and decisively. In order to fully optimise the BrahMos MRCM’s operational parameters and ensure synchronised battlespace management in a network-centric warfare environment, the Army is now in the process of fielding the indigenous Command-level Battlespace Surveillance System; Corps-level ‘Shakti’ Artillery Command, Control & Communications System; Command Information Decision Support System (CIDSS) and its related Division-level Force Multiplier Command Post (FMCP) and Brigade-level Mobile Communications Terminal (MCT); all of which will be used for target acquisition, designation and engagement under near-real-time conditions by the BrahMos MRCM. This in turn will enable a single BrahMos Regiment to launch 36 MRCMs to successfully engage critical targets with pinpoint accuracy within a matter of seconds. Each missile can be pre-programmed to fly multiple flight trajectories through up to eight waypoints permitting turns up to 80 degrees, traverse any type of terrain from sea-level to high altitude, and engage targets whether on forward or reverse slopes of mountains and valleys. The Army on June 21 last year officially received its first Battery of the BrahMos MRCM in the presence of Avul Pakir Jainulabdeen Abdul Kalam, the then President and Commander-in-Chief of India’s armed forces; Defence Minister Arakkaparambil Kurian Antony; and Gen Joginder Jaswant Singh, the then Chief of the Army Staff and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. In all, the IA will possess a total of some 250 land-attack variants of the BrahMos MRCMs, including war wastage reserves, by 2017. It was on February 3, 2005 that the Government of India’s Cabinet Committee on National Security had approved the Army’s plans to raise the first of three Regiments of the BrahMos’ MRCM as part of the 40th and 41st Artillery Divisions in the 10th and 11th Five-Year Plan periods (2002-2007 and 2008-2013). For series-producing the MRCM, the sprawling BrahMos Integration Complex (BIC) in Hyderabad was commissioned in early 2004. The BIC today contains dedicated facilities such as standby generators; compressed air facility; inward inspection block; storage facilities for mechanical, electrical and electronic systems, bonded stores fuel filling area, magazine storage areas for propulsion systems and explosive devices, ultrasonic testing and sub-system test facilities, machining shop, and precision co-curing/autoclave facilities. BrahMos Aerospace has created a consortium of 20 Indian and 30 Russian industries since 2002 to undertake production of the MRCM’s intricate precision components and subassemblies, which number more than 2,000. The Indian companies include private and public sector companies, such as Larsen & Toubro, Godrej & Boyce, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd, Bharat Earth Movers Ltd, KELTECH and Electronics Corp of India Ltd. While the Indian firms are providing the MRCM’s airframe, launch tubes, wheeled MALs and MCPs, digitised inertial navigation and flight control systems, fire-control system, imaging infra-red seeker, secure two-way data links, and mission software, Russian companies like NPO Mashinostroyenia and GRANIT Central Scientific Research Institute are providing the liquid-fuel ramjet engine, and the SGH active radar seeker for the missile’s anti-ship variant. All these components and sub-systems are finally installed and integrated at the BIC.
In addition to the SS-150 and BrahMos, the Army is also expediting the induction of multi-barrel rocket launchers (MBRL) like the 9K58 Smerch-M. Deliveries of the first of two Regiments of the 12-tube 300mm, 90km-range MBRL, comprising 36 launch vehicles, were completed last June by Russia’s SPLAV State Research and Production Enterprise, and the procurement of another 18 follow-on 9K58 Smerch-Ms was sanctioned late last month. Deliveries of all 12 THALESRaytheon Corp-built AN/TPQ-37(V)1 Firefinder weapons locating radars worth $142.4 million (Rs9.5 billion) were completed in September 2005. Deliveries of the first 24 of up to 40 weapons locating radars (developed by the DRDO and being built by Bharat Electronics Ltd) will commence by 2010.—Prasun K. Sengupta
The Akash E-SHORADS surface-to-air missile (SAM), developed by India’s Kanchanbagh-based Defence Research & Development Laboratory (DRDL), officially has no takers as yet. The Akash’s R & D project has been in existence for the past 20 years. Originally slated for completion within a 12-year period, the project’s Rs5 billion R & D phase had to extended by another eight years due to previously unforeseen technological and operational challenges, especially with regard to its fire-control and missile guidance systems. When the project took off in the late 1980s, the DRDL had proudly claimed that target engagement will be undertaken by the ground-based, active phased-array Rajendra L-band Battery-Level Radar (BLR) and a track-via-missile guidance system for the missile. However, the sheer technological challenges forced the DRDL to abandon this path by the mid-1990s, and the DRDO’s Bangalore-based Electronics R & D establishment (LRDE) instead took up the development of a passive phased-array variant of the Rajendra target engagement radar, whose laboratory version had 4,000 phase shifters, a spectrally pure travelling wave tube (TWT) transmitter (which at that time was imported from THALES Nederland), two-stage superheterodyne correlation receiver for three channels, a high-speed digital signal processor, real-time management computer, and a radar data processor. For the 25km-range missile the radio command-link guidance technique was adopted. It was this system that was until 2002 being proposed an all weather area air defence system for defending vulnerable areas (VA) and vulnerable points (VP) against manned airborne targets approaching from medium and high altitudes. The system has been designed to neutralise multiple airborne targets attacking from several directions simultaneously, and is fully autonomous in terms of its operation. The Akash E-SHORADS is now being offered in two versions: one whose launcher is mounted on the hull of a T-72M main battle tank (for the Indian Army), and another mounted on a cross-country truck built by TATA Motors, this being for the Indian Air Force (IAF). When deployed, the Akash comprises a network of early warning, tracking, and engagement radars and fire-direction control centres, all functioning in a network-centric manner. The system has advanced battlefield management software, which carries out relative threat computation and pairing of targets and missiles and missile fire-control. Dr R R Panyam has been the Project Director for Akash since 2002. About 1,000 scientists from 13 DRDO laboratories have contributed thus far to the Akash’s R & D effort.
