The Indian Air Force (IAF) adopted a multi-pronged approach to customise the Su-30MKI to the IAF’s qualitative requirements and enhance its operational reliability and serviceability, especially once it became clear that Russia was perfectly willing to incorporate systems and sub-systems of non-Russia origin. One of the main areas of thrust was predictive maintenance through HUMS.
For acquiring this capability, the IAF joined forces with South Africa’s Aerospace Monitoring And Systems (Pty) Ltd (AMS), a high-technology electronics engineering company that designs, develops, manufactures and supports specialised proprietary Aircraft Monitoring and Data Recording Systems. AMS has serviced this specific niche of the global aerospace and defence market since 1984. Predictive maintenance means the on- and off-board processing of aircraft sub-systems data, resulting in an accurate, conclusive indication of the health and usage status of various airborne systems. The heart of any health-and-usage monitoring system (HUMS) is a Data Acquisition Unit (DAU), capable of handling hundreds of input signals, supported by powerful processing hardware and software. The HUMS not only has the capability to monitor almost every aircraft system and sub-system, including the avionics sub-systems, it can also act as an engineering data recorder. For the Su-30MKI, AMS was contracted for providing total HUMS solutions, starting with the definition of the IAF’s qualitative requirements, followed by the provision (development and implementation), integration and support phases. AMS’ total HUMS package, as installed on the Su-30MKI, includes the following:
• The Crash Survivable Memory Unit (CSMU), whose prime mission is to save aircraft data and cockpit voice information in a crash-protected, non-volatile memory for post-incident/accident investigations. The CSMU receives aircraft flight data from a DAU on an ARINC 717 Harvard Bi-phase communications channel, and stores the data in a crash-protected memory module in the CSMU. The CSMU also records two channels of cockpit voice information, and stores the information is the crash-protected memory module in the CSMU.
For acquiring this capability, the IAF joined forces with South Africa’s Aerospace Monitoring And Systems (Pty) Ltd (AMS), a high-technology electronics engineering company that designs, develops, manufactures and supports specialised proprietary Aircraft Monitoring and Data Recording Systems. AMS has serviced this specific niche of the global aerospace and defence market since 1984. Predictive maintenance means the on- and off-board processing of aircraft sub-systems data, resulting in an accurate, conclusive indication of the health and usage status of various airborne systems. The heart of any health-and-usage monitoring system (HUMS) is a Data Acquisition Unit (DAU), capable of handling hundreds of input signals, supported by powerful processing hardware and software. The HUMS not only has the capability to monitor almost every aircraft system and sub-system, including the avionics sub-systems, it can also act as an engineering data recorder. For the Su-30MKI, AMS was contracted for providing total HUMS solutions, starting with the definition of the IAF’s qualitative requirements, followed by the provision (development and implementation), integration and support phases. AMS’ total HUMS package, as installed on the Su-30MKI, includes the following:
• The Crash Survivable Memory Unit (CSMU), whose prime mission is to save aircraft data and cockpit voice information in a crash-protected, non-volatile memory for post-incident/accident investigations. The CSMU receives aircraft flight data from a DAU on an ARINC 717 Harvard Bi-phase communications channel, and stores the data in a crash-protected memory module in the CSMU. The CSMU also records two channels of cockpit voice information, and stores the information is the crash-protected memory module in the CSMU.
• The DAU, whose prime mission is to acquire, process and store aircraft flight data and cockpit voice data, and forward the aircraft data to the CSMU on an ARINC 717 FDR channel. Recorded aircraft flight data and cockpit voice data is stored in non-volatile flash disk memory in the DAU for post-flight analysis of Su-30MKI component health and usage, and debriefing.
• The airborne Flight Data Recorder (FDR) system, which consists of a DAU, CSMU, and a Maintenance Panel Unit (MPU). The FDR ground support system consists of a Flightline System (FLS) and a CSMU Control Unit (CCU). The prime mission of the FDR system is to record and process aircraft data and cockpit voice information. A recorded sub-set of flight and voice data is stored in crash protected memory for post incident/accident investigations. Recorded flight data in the DAU is used for post flight analysis of aircraft component health and usage. The prime mission of the FLS is to download data from the on-board DAU and retrieve modify the DAU configuration data. The FLS is a ruggedised notebook computer that can be transported to the flight line and operated under harsh exposed conditions. All inputs in the field are via a touch-sensitive screen using graphic-based MMI screens. The FLS can download selected flight and voice data from the DAU. The FLS also has an external keyboard and mouse that allow easier use under office conditions using a special interface loom.
Fatigue in metallic structures is associated with cyclic loading, and can occur at low stress levels which would not otherwise cause failure when applied as a single event. Repeated loading causes cumulative damage. A structure will absorb cumulative damage from fluctuating loads, which eventually leads to the formation of small, detectable cracks. This is termed the life-to-crack initiation of the aircraft and in certain circumstances the airframe life is considered to have been expended when these first cracks start to appear. Nevertheless, aircraft can be operated past this time, into the so-called crack-growth phase, albeit with different maintenance and inspection intervals and procedures. With modern fracture mechanics techniques, it is possible to predict and predict/correct crack growth in almost any geometrical configuration. This in turn allows one to extend the life of an airframe beyond the threshold of crack initiation. This approach, along with damage tolerant repair procedures, can safely extend the life of an airframe beyond its previously-anticipated phasing out date. Finally, the cracks start to grow rapidly, leading to fracture. Tolerance to cyclic loading varies widely for different materials, with certain fracture-tough steels exhibiting excellent fatigue properties. However, the choice of material is often dictated more by the weight for static strength.
Even with the ever-increasing employment of composite materials, aircraft structures are still predominantly made up of aluminium and titanium alloys, and this brings up the issue of structural fatigue caused by fluctuating loads. For fracture-tough steel structures, designing for low mean- and fluctuating stress levels can give a near-infinite life. Unlike these steels, high-strength aluminium alloy structures cannot be designed for infinite life without considerable costs in structure weight. Any fluctuating stress imposes cumulative damage, which will eventually lead to fracture and failure. Weight efficient aircraft structures therefore have a finite life. The basic aims for the Su-30MKI’s aircraft fatigue monitoring and management system are generally:
Fatigue in metallic structures is associated with cyclic loading, and can occur at low stress levels which would not otherwise cause failure when applied as a single event. Repeated loading causes cumulative damage. A structure will absorb cumulative damage from fluctuating loads, which eventually leads to the formation of small, detectable cracks. This is termed the life-to-crack initiation of the aircraft and in certain circumstances the airframe life is considered to have been expended when these first cracks start to appear. Nevertheless, aircraft can be operated past this time, into the so-called crack-growth phase, albeit with different maintenance and inspection intervals and procedures. With modern fracture mechanics techniques, it is possible to predict and predict/correct crack growth in almost any geometrical configuration. This in turn allows one to extend the life of an airframe beyond the threshold of crack initiation. This approach, along with damage tolerant repair procedures, can safely extend the life of an airframe beyond its previously-anticipated phasing out date. Finally, the cracks start to grow rapidly, leading to fracture. Tolerance to cyclic loading varies widely for different materials, with certain fracture-tough steels exhibiting excellent fatigue properties. However, the choice of material is often dictated more by the weight for static strength.
Even with the ever-increasing employment of composite materials, aircraft structures are still predominantly made up of aluminium and titanium alloys, and this brings up the issue of structural fatigue caused by fluctuating loads. For fracture-tough steel structures, designing for low mean- and fluctuating stress levels can give a near-infinite life. Unlike these steels, high-strength aluminium alloy structures cannot be designed for infinite life without considerable costs in structure weight. Any fluctuating stress imposes cumulative damage, which will eventually lead to fracture and failure. Weight efficient aircraft structures therefore have a finite life. The basic aims for the Su-30MKI’s aircraft fatigue monitoring and management system are generally:
• Verification of the structural integrity and longevity of new aircraft.
• Life monitoring, maintenance, and safe life extension of aging aircraft.
Interest in the monitoring and managing of aircraft structural fatigue has greatly increased globally over the last two decades. Fleet operators who are considering the implementation of a HUMS programme should take cognisance of why this is so. Notwithstanding finite structural life, the much higher rate of advance in avionics technology, relative to aerodynamic, airframe and engine technologies, has meant that aircraft “obsolescence” is now determined more by the avionics fit than the performance and efficiency of the airframe/engine combination. This is particularly the case for military aircraft. Because of rapid ageing of avionics technology, avionics upgrades to in-service aircraft have become the norm. These can take the form of frequent small upgrades, or major refits once or twice during its service life. A new engine and airframe can account for 40-50% of the total cost of a new combat aircraft, while adding little of consequence to its operational capabilities. Increasingly, cost-conscious air forces and other fleet operators are opting to retain existing airframes and engines and to spend their money on capability-enhancing equipment. An extreme example is the B-52H aircraft, which entered service in the late 1950s and is currently expected to remain in service up to the year 2040, a life of 80 years!
In light of the above it is clear that the airframe is the limiting factor in aircraft longevity, and this in turn determines the economic viability, or otherwise, of any upgrade programmes that might be envisaged. The remaining airframe life is a decisive factor in aircraft upgrade decisions. Therefore there is an increasing demand for accurate tracking of life consumption. Many operators acquire used rather than new aircraft as a matter of policy, and the availability of accurate remaining life estimates can greatly increase the resale value of an aircraft fleet. As part of the initial design process, an aircraft manufacturer will assume a flight loading spectrum to which the aircraft will be subjected to during service, and design for a specified life on the basis of that spectrum. However, changing roles and missions may, to a greater or lesser degree, invalidate the initial assumptions. In the case of military (and particularly combat) aircraft it is quite possible that the roles they are eventually called upon to fulfil, and missions they are then required to carry out, will be very different to those originally envisaged. Initial estimates of fatigue life are then invalid, and a great deal of uncertainty is introduced into fleet management. The objective of fatigue monitoring in HUMS is to reduce these uncertainties. There are cases where the initial life estimates have been extended by 50% as a result of more accurate measurement and monitoring programs implemented in service.
In Output-Based Contracting (OBC) an aircraft supplier is no longer paid for a once-off delivery of systems, but instead is contracted to provide a service, for example flying hours. There is currently a marked trend towards this type of contracting, which brings greater contract risk while at the same time also holding out the prospect of higher financial returns. Minimising risks, while increasing operating efficiencies and maximising the life of the aircraft, poses great challenges. The aircraft provider can meet these challenges by including fatigue monitoring as part of general health- and usage monitoring. Fatigue monitoring can protect the service provider from the consequences of unduly severe usage, by providing a record of such usage and the impact thereof on the structural life of the aircraft. Output-based contracting exposes the aircraft service provider to higher levels of risk. One major risk is that the client’s usage of the aircraft will not correspond to that assumed by the contractor at the time of initial costing. For example, it is quite possible that different missions with more demanding mission profiles could be imposed during the life of the aircraft. Furthermore, flight limitations may be exceeded more frequently during an given mission. These eventualities would impact negatively on the cost of providing the service contracted for. Monitoring will provide clear indications as to whether the aircraft is being operated within its contractual limitations and provide recourse to the supplier.
The aircraft operator/end-user can use health-and-usage monitoring to minimise contractual risk. But after this, aircraft maintenance operations can be managed so as to improve profitability. If costs are estimated conservatively at the time of bidding, and if realised costs can be minimised during the service period by intelligent management, the higher reward commensurate with higher risk will be obtained. A more accurate knowledge of the probable condition of the aircraft can allow on-condition maintenance, as opposed to unnecessarily frequent and therefore more expensive scheduled teardowns and inspections. OBC requires that a given number of flying hours are to be provided per month. Aircraft availability is therefore a major factor. Anticipation of problems via fatigue monitoring (and general systems condition monitoring) allows early corrective action to be taken, with beneficial effects on availability. Less aircraft are then required to fulfil the contractual obligations.
Initially at the OEM the focus is on methods for fatigue and fracture mechanics technology in the design of durable, damage-tolerant aircraft structures. Aircraft manufacturers generate and maintain Fatigue and Stress Corrosion Manuals. Once the aircraft has been in service for some time, the operator will focus on the extended safe use of aging aircraft: The applicable technologies have to do with the basic fatigue and fracture behaviour of structural metallic materials. For the Su-30MKI, methods have been developed by the IAF for the following:
Interest in the monitoring and managing of aircraft structural fatigue has greatly increased globally over the last two decades. Fleet operators who are considering the implementation of a HUMS programme should take cognisance of why this is so. Notwithstanding finite structural life, the much higher rate of advance in avionics technology, relative to aerodynamic, airframe and engine technologies, has meant that aircraft “obsolescence” is now determined more by the avionics fit than the performance and efficiency of the airframe/engine combination. This is particularly the case for military aircraft. Because of rapid ageing of avionics technology, avionics upgrades to in-service aircraft have become the norm. These can take the form of frequent small upgrades, or major refits once or twice during its service life. A new engine and airframe can account for 40-50% of the total cost of a new combat aircraft, while adding little of consequence to its operational capabilities. Increasingly, cost-conscious air forces and other fleet operators are opting to retain existing airframes and engines and to spend their money on capability-enhancing equipment. An extreme example is the B-52H aircraft, which entered service in the late 1950s and is currently expected to remain in service up to the year 2040, a life of 80 years!
In light of the above it is clear that the airframe is the limiting factor in aircraft longevity, and this in turn determines the economic viability, or otherwise, of any upgrade programmes that might be envisaged. The remaining airframe life is a decisive factor in aircraft upgrade decisions. Therefore there is an increasing demand for accurate tracking of life consumption. Many operators acquire used rather than new aircraft as a matter of policy, and the availability of accurate remaining life estimates can greatly increase the resale value of an aircraft fleet. As part of the initial design process, an aircraft manufacturer will assume a flight loading spectrum to which the aircraft will be subjected to during service, and design for a specified life on the basis of that spectrum. However, changing roles and missions may, to a greater or lesser degree, invalidate the initial assumptions. In the case of military (and particularly combat) aircraft it is quite possible that the roles they are eventually called upon to fulfil, and missions they are then required to carry out, will be very different to those originally envisaged. Initial estimates of fatigue life are then invalid, and a great deal of uncertainty is introduced into fleet management. The objective of fatigue monitoring in HUMS is to reduce these uncertainties. There are cases where the initial life estimates have been extended by 50% as a result of more accurate measurement and monitoring programs implemented in service.
In Output-Based Contracting (OBC) an aircraft supplier is no longer paid for a once-off delivery of systems, but instead is contracted to provide a service, for example flying hours. There is currently a marked trend towards this type of contracting, which brings greater contract risk while at the same time also holding out the prospect of higher financial returns. Minimising risks, while increasing operating efficiencies and maximising the life of the aircraft, poses great challenges. The aircraft provider can meet these challenges by including fatigue monitoring as part of general health- and usage monitoring. Fatigue monitoring can protect the service provider from the consequences of unduly severe usage, by providing a record of such usage and the impact thereof on the structural life of the aircraft. Output-based contracting exposes the aircraft service provider to higher levels of risk. One major risk is that the client’s usage of the aircraft will not correspond to that assumed by the contractor at the time of initial costing. For example, it is quite possible that different missions with more demanding mission profiles could be imposed during the life of the aircraft. Furthermore, flight limitations may be exceeded more frequently during an given mission. These eventualities would impact negatively on the cost of providing the service contracted for. Monitoring will provide clear indications as to whether the aircraft is being operated within its contractual limitations and provide recourse to the supplier.
The aircraft operator/end-user can use health-and-usage monitoring to minimise contractual risk. But after this, aircraft maintenance operations can be managed so as to improve profitability. If costs are estimated conservatively at the time of bidding, and if realised costs can be minimised during the service period by intelligent management, the higher reward commensurate with higher risk will be obtained. A more accurate knowledge of the probable condition of the aircraft can allow on-condition maintenance, as opposed to unnecessarily frequent and therefore more expensive scheduled teardowns and inspections. OBC requires that a given number of flying hours are to be provided per month. Aircraft availability is therefore a major factor. Anticipation of problems via fatigue monitoring (and general systems condition monitoring) allows early corrective action to be taken, with beneficial effects on availability. Less aircraft are then required to fulfil the contractual obligations.
Initially at the OEM the focus is on methods for fatigue and fracture mechanics technology in the design of durable, damage-tolerant aircraft structures. Aircraft manufacturers generate and maintain Fatigue and Stress Corrosion Manuals. Once the aircraft has been in service for some time, the operator will focus on the extended safe use of aging aircraft: The applicable technologies have to do with the basic fatigue and fracture behaviour of structural metallic materials. For the Su-30MKI, methods have been developed by the IAF for the following:
• Fatigue loading spectra;
• Fatigue analysis methods;
• Material fatigue behaviour;
• Fracture mechanics;
• Damage tolerance analysis and testing of redundant metallic aircraft structures;
• Fatigue crack growth analysis;
• Crack growth, residual strength analyses, and aircraft structural integrity programmes;
• Ageing aircraft issues.—Prasun K. Sengupta
93 comments:
A big "Thank you" for the ppt's.
So, how does this bother you,prasun?
To Void Walker: I don't understand what you're asking. What bothers me? I haven't said anything above that should be bothersome to me. Can you be specific in your query?
Any info or scoop from SARAS air craft crash. It has been a long time on that front.
Prasun da, in F-18E/F a engine monitering system is present which aware pilot about engine's condition through MFD. Does any such system exist in SU-30MKI?
Any extra info. from the crashed sukhoi , because very little info. is present about the crash.
Prasun, correct me if I am wrong but I remember DRDO developing HUMS for LCA which they claimed was so impressive that it was adopter for EF Typhoon. Or was it something else?
Prasun K Sengupta can you provide help be sharing some information about the speed of Pakistani/Chinese (I guess names don’t have any effect of speed right) Indian short range ballistic missiles.And what is difference between RDY-3 and Rc-400
Prasun K Sengupta said... Larsen & Toubro's 300-tonne mini-submarine that was co-developed with Italian companies is still undergoing sea trials and its prodfuction variants will be used by MARCOS.
What is intended use of this submarine?
Prasun K Sengupta said... Selex-built Vixen 5000e AESA has yet to be qualified on the JAS-39IN. But the Vixen 5000e is definitely destined for the JF-17 Thunder and FC-20 of the PAF.
Any details about the Vixen 5000e AESA?i wasn’t able to find any on the internet
Playing Catch-Up
By when we will see Pakistan inducting HQ-9 SAM? What will be the typical breakup of the HQ-9 Regiment ie number of launchers and support vehicles?
When will the introduction of A-100E will begin? will Pakistan opt for local production?
I have read in one of your post(comment section) in this blog that Pakistan will purchase four regiments of HQ-9 while article says that 3 regiments , so which is true number?
And lastly about 400 T-84U from Ukraine, Does that mean that PA has trouble with AlKhalid tank? Or they fear the T-90S/M?i mean what’s the logic here? There are already lacking funds for import and now these 400 tanks to be imported? Will these be new build in Ukraine or refurbished ones?
To MJ26459:
Here is Selex-built Vixen 5000e AESA
http://www.selex-sas.com/EN/Common/files/SelexSAS_UK/pdf_datasheet/radar/Vixen500E_.pdf
I think there is a direct relation in speed and range of ballistic missiles( R=v^2/g ). So same range means same speed.
"undergoing sea trials and its production variants will be used by MARCOS."
Q: What is intended use of this submarine?
Ans: MARCOS(marine commandos)
hope it helps.
bty what does "MJ26459" stand for?
To MJ26459: Seaspray is a family of maritime surveillance radars. Its not used on fighters. Even though it may have similarities to fighter radars, Seaspray 5000E is structured differently to fit as a pod under helos or UAVs.
In case you just turned 50 belated happy birthday.
To Abhinaba Da: Typically, a HUMS on board a Super Hornet or Su-30MKI or even a Hawk Mk132 monitors 32 dynamic parameters, including turbofan performance. The HUMS suiote installed on the Su-30MKI is an enhanced variant of the HUMS suite installed on the Hawk Mk132 LIFT. Both were developed by the same South Afican OEM. Regarding the Su-30MKI crash, I have my own list of probable causes, but let us see what IAF HQ comes up with (they should be able to within less than a week as te HUMS will provide them with all the reqd data). But one thing which is undeniable that the IAF needs to shed its 'duality' existence and formulate some no-nonsense, mandatory and uniform flying training/operational conversion/flight proficiency sustainence procedures/practices. What I mean by that is the IAF cannot create exceptions when procuring readily available flying training aids from non-Russia sources (i.e. for aircraft and helicopters of Western origin) and when it comes to Russia-origin aircraft, conveniently 'forget' to acquire such flying training aids. This has got to stop and the IAF must shed its past baggage and come clean on why throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s flying training aids were not acquired for the MiG-21, MiG-23BN, MiG-27M, MiG-29B-12, Mi-8T, Mi-17, Mi-25, Mi-35P, Mi-26T, and the Su-30MKI. Only if the IAF releases such data and comes clean will we all know what exactly were the reasons behind the high incidences of fatal air crashes involving aircraft of Soviet/Russian origin.
To Harpreet: What you're referring is the applications software for the KADECU or full-authority digital engine control system for the Kaveri turbofan. The advent of HUMS in India began in the early 1980s when US-based Chadwick Helmuth developed a HUMS suite combined with a rotor balancing system for the TV3117 engine of the IAF's Mi-17. Subsequently, a Mumbai-based company developed a similar HUMS for trend-monitoring of the RD-33 turbofan of the MiG-29B-12 and this very system was also exported to Malaysia. By the late 1990s, an Indian company called MERLINHAWK had co-developed with Chadwick Helmuth a family of ligtweight HUMS for fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft. Hopefully these will be fitted on the yet-to-be-upgraded Sea King Mk42B and Ka-28PL helicopters of the Indian Navy, the NRUAV, and on the IAF's Mi-17V-5. But what is highly surprising is that such HUMS suites, which are now standard installations (and no longer optional), have yet to be flight-qualified on either the Dhruv ALH or the LCH. I find this highly astonishing, to say the least.
To Anonymous @ May 03, 2009 8:43:00 AM
But Prasun K Sengupta said that Vixen 5000e AESA is for JF-17 and Fc-20
thats why i am Little confused here
Its little too early for my 50th birthday but I will take this in advance
Prasun K Sengupta which version of RD-series power plant Indian MIG-29s will use after upgradation and will thrust be improved
Now, a media report lights up on 'bunting' manoeuver of crashed sukhoi. When actually such manoeuver occur? How it tossed sukhoi around at an angle 270 degrees?
Prasun, there is a Seaspray 5000E and a Vixen 500E.
http://www.selex-sas.com/SelexSAS/EN/Business/SelexSAS_UK/Air/Radar/index.sdo
Did you do a typo in "Vixen 5000E" or is it a growth version of Vixen 500E.
You're right. The Vixen 500e is meant for fixed-wing combat aircraft while the Seaspray 5000e is for fixed-wing maritime surveillance/ASW aircraft and helicopters.
To MJ26459@9:34AM: It will be the RD33-3 with FADEC.
To Abhinaba: That manoeuvre takes place when there is a catastrophic failure of the digital flight control computer and its related fly-by-wire flight control system.
$40 million for each Mirage2000 upgrade to RDY Mk3! Don't we have a better option? Northrop Grumman is trying to breach $2 million mark for SABR AESA.
So, Prasun, could you fill in any of the gaps about the radars I mentioned in my last post on the previous thread?
To Nava: All the data that you seek are available as open-source material. Publications like AW & ST have published several feature-length stories on new-generation AESA radars like the APG-79, EL/M-2052, APG-80, APG-81 and the RBE-2 detailing their respective performance parameters. Even IAI/ELTA has during aerospace expos given out black-and-white photos of high-resolution SAR/GMTI imagery obtained by the EL/M-2052. As for range envelopes and power output, it is up to the end-users to tweak them as per their unique requirements. If you have more internal volume available as in the case of the Su-30MKI, you can accommodate a very high-power transmitter/receiver and even an exciter (as in the case of the NO-11 BARS) that will 'burn' through EW jamming. If I'm not mistaken, sometime last year I already uploaded the actual RBE-2 AESA's close-up photos (taken during the Paris Air Show of 2007) and from that you can judge for yourself how many T/R modules are there.
I don't work in the defense industry man. It's just something I've taken interest in lately. Therefor I don't posses back issues of the various magazines, nor am I inclined to dole out hundreds of dollars for them. I certainly don't go to aerospace expos. The main reason I enjoy your blog is that you provide detailed information about issues, that while not being secret, are beyond the reach of non-professionals like myself- and for free.
To Nava: If you go to the websites of McGraw Hill Show News and Flightglobal.com you yourself will be able to read the magazines and the Show Dailies for free. No need to buy them.
To Harpreet: I think you will agree with me when I say that today there are only two radar manufacturers that have not only had years of experience in developing and series-producing in bulk AESA radars for combat aircraft since the 1980s, but also possess the reqd industrial and financial clout for offering mature-design airborne AESA radars, i.e. Raytheon and Northrop Grumman. THALES has been developing the RBE-2 AESA radar since the mid-1980s and it was only last year that it succeeded in overcoming the industrial and technological challenges for undertaking series-production. Therefore, the only M-MRCAs that will be offered with guaranteed performance AESA radars with minimal cost-escalation will be the F-16IN Super Viper and the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, considering that both these aircraft types are in bulk production and the SABR being offered for retrofit on several hundred F-16C/Ds worldwide in future. Hell, even the APG-63(V)3 may be sold in bulk for the F-15E/K retrofit market! The only other M-MRCA that I can envisage being equipped with AESA radars in large numbers is the EF-2000 Typhoon. But..and this is a big but...if IAI/ELTA and the DRDO can pump enough money into the EL/M-2052 project, then this radar could end up on more than 220 of the envisaged Tejas LCA Mk2 and some 150 of the FGFAs. Only if such production volumes can be attained, then the EL/M-2052 venture and its in-country production could become a commercially viable option.
BTW, great reply at BROADSWORD 03 May 2009 @11:21!
To MJ26459@3:58AM: The HQ-9 LR-SAM contract was inked last February and hardware deliveries will begin only early next year. The hardware ordered is only for three fully-equipped Regiments, but the peacetime deployment will see the equivalent of four Regiments being equipped in terms of personnel, with 1 Battery from each of the three Regiments being re-allocated to form a Training Regiment. The A-100E MBRL deliveries are now underway.
Regarding the Al Khalid MBT, its design was frozen in the mid-1990s (it was originally called the Type 90 MBT by NORINCO, its developer) and its welded turret cannot be modified anymore in terms of MBT survivability features. It still is an excellent MBT to be used by second-echelon armoured formations, but not for spearheading armoured thrusts. This is where the reqmt for the T-84UD arises as this MBT is a serious effort by Ukrainian MBT designers to rectify the fundamental design flaws of post-World War II Soviet MBT designs starting with the T-62. The T-84UD is most likely to be used in the Punjab plains and north of the Shakargarh Bulge and will be employed specifically to square off against the Arjun Mk1 MBT, which also be employed in the same geographical theatre.
To Prasun da : Pune & Bareilly -the two airfields where our sukhoi are based,have total 3 squadron of sukhoi( i.e total 60 aircraafts,20 in each squadron) .Among these 60 aircrafts 50 from russia & remaining 10 from our Nashik division of HAL. But in Red flag & Indra -dhanush excercise we see SB115,SB117 numbered sukhoi,which means No.20 squadron has extra aircrafts beyond 20 aircrafts, indicating some russian aircrafts are grounded. I am little confused about this matter. If i am wrong please correct it.Another quary from me , what is the position of 1st batch of 8 su-30MKs & 2nd batch of 10 su-30Ks.
Prasun few questions
a ) Are we going for 90 more of MKI with AESA ? What new feature can we expect with the new MKI compared to the present BARS equipped MKI mk3 ?
b ) How capable is the Russia AESA radar compared to the others in the race offered for Mig-35
c ) In your opinion how does J-10 compare with Tejas ?
So Pak is acquiring all these A-100E MBRL, HQ-9, T-84UD etc while their foreign minister was on CNN crying about his army not having bullet proof jackets, slippers, underwear and what not.
The way to deal with them is to keep them on the edge, dont let them fall over but also dont give them space to maneuver.
I wish our govt had some strategic vision. I am sure EL/M-2052 has been accepted for LCA in response to Pakistn's selection of Vixen 500E. Else DRDO would have never given way. Our acquisition programes are mostly limited to such kney jerk reactions.
As much I would like DRDO to do wonders I am intimately aware of why it can't. Saddled with a self centered and self serving bureaucracy there is little their scientist can do even with the best of their intentions.
To, Prasun da-
AIM-9X has wide seeker angle(to 90 degree off-boresight) than R-73/73ME/74M(40 to 60 degree off-boresight ),but in operational range R-73 beat AIM-9X( 300m. to 30 km. vs. 1km. to 19km. ). German IRIS-T also has impressive features. Now, please inform your thought about these IR missiles. Which one is effective in rear hemisphere & low altitude aerial-warefare? Which version of R-73 is present under service with our IAF?
Thanks Prasun K Sengupta
Now if you can clear last point on this topic of HQ-9
How many batteries are in one regiment of HQ-9
On the Su30 MKI inventory............reports suggest......5 Sqdns so far( No 8 'Pursoots' and No 24 'Hawks' at Bareilly; No 20 'Lightnings' and No 30 'Rhino's' at Pune; with the fifth Sqdn No 31 'Lions' converting at Tezpur (8+ aircraft so far ??)/ read a conflicting report that 'Lions' may be based at Halwara....not sure). Also 2 more new Sqdns by the end of this year/early next year (20 aircraft Russian built - last of the 40 new ones ordered; and 20 HAL built.....one Sqdn at Tezpur/2nd at Halwara). The 8th Sqdn in 2010 end based in Rajastan (??).
One the inventory issue........varying numbers......last i heard it was 100 to 110 ( now 109), with 37 supplied by HAL so far. Not sure, but, think 100 seems closer ( 16 frontline in 4 flights of 4; 2 attrition reserve; 2 training ).
please correct me if i am wrong somewhere.
rgds
To, anonymous at 1:48:00 AM -
Thanks for uptodate information. Have you any direct link about the report?
To Abhinaba: Every operational squadron has attrition reserves of between two and four units. In terms of deployment, based on current orders for a total of 230 Su-30MKIs, it boils down to 12.5 squadrons that will eventually be distributed among six operational air base hubs, of which Pune and Barielly are already operational, with Halwara and Tezpur to follow. One more will become operational down south and eventually Hashimara too will host the Su-30MKIs. As for the earlier Su-30MKs and Su-30Ks they've all been returned back to Russia.
Regarding comparison of parameters of within visual range AAMs and their off-boresight target acquisition capabilities, the two most critical factors will be the combined G-force that am AAM can sustain, and the target acquisition and designation capabilities of the helmet-mounted display. Therefore, it will not be wise to just look at the figures of AAMs like AIM-9X, Iris-T, Python-5, AIM-132 ASRAAM or R-73E in isolation in order to determine their mission effectiveness. The IAF had better take a good look at how much more effective the R-73E/TopOwl combination of the Indian Navy's MiG-29K is, compared to the Sura-M/R-73E combination of the Su-30MKI.
To Anon@8:25PM: The Russians haven't as yet released any data on the performance parameters of the AESA radar destined for the Su-30MKI. But the last 90 aircraft to roll out of HAL's assembly line will have AESA radars. The airframe too will undergo some structural enhancements and modifications.
Regarding comparisons, one cannot really compare the Tejas LCA Mk1 as it now exists with the J-10. One will have to wait for the Tejas Mk2 LCA to emerge as this will be the LCA variant that will be produced in bulk.
TO MJ26459: Three Batteries per Regiment.
Hi, still on the Su 30MKI ..............seems total will be 11 Sqdns (20 a/c each)eventually by 2014-15. Location's will most likely be...
3 at Pune by 2009 end (?)
2 at Bareilly
2 at Chhauba/Tezpur (Assam)2010-12
2 at Halwara (Punjab)by 2011-13
2 at Jodhpur (Rajasthan)by 2012-14
(One Pune based Sqdn may be shifted to Tezpur, eventually being replaced at Pune by a new Sqdn(HAL built)..........not sure about this report; but, Pune will definitely have 3 Sqdns)
Detachments may be shifted from these Sqdns for short periods to other Stations for short periods.......Srinagar/Leh/Andamansetc. Also, presently, 2 Su's are in Russia for structural changes for carrying the BrahMos.
Some Su's (eventually around 10) will be with various Training/Tactical units(TACDE; OCU; HAL).
Picked up all this info from various newspaper reports and indian military sites.
rgds.
Do you have brochure for HQ-9
prasun,
r we procuring a new aam for jaguars or it will use MICA IR which i think is part of M2k upg.
also what is the status of the Tejas LSP 3 and PV-5? i have pics of PV-5 being pushed on tarmac(some 3-4 months ago).
also will the Tejas be getting the Topsight E? or we are developing our own system?
also can u predict(if possible) the procurement cost of Tejas mk.1
Prasun:
Is the Tejas' EW suite based on technologies derived from the collaborative agreement between Elisra and DARE?
To Anon@3:54AM: I have more than brochures for the HQ-9, HQ-16 and Hunter-2. But am unable to upload them for now.
To Sachin Sathe: Originally both the Mica and ASRAAM were considered for the Jaguar and Mirage 2000 upgrade, but subsequently it was decided that the Jaguars will be fitted with R-73E (replacing the R-60T and R-550 Magic 2) while the upgraded Mirage 2000s will have the R-27R/R-27RET combination plus the R-73E.
The maiden flights of the Tejas LVA LSP-3 and LSP-5 have been delayed due to delays in installation of the integrated defensive aids suite being co-developed by DARE and EADS. Regarding the HMD for Tejas LCA it will be the DASH-3 from Elbit Systems. The Topsight-E will be for the upgraded Mirage 2000s. I don't have any figures of the Tejas Mk1's procurement costs.
To Nava: I believe I've answered your query above. The Tejas LCA's on-board systems of Israeli origin will be the Litening-3 LDP from RAFAEL, and DASH-3 HMD.
Oh, sorry if I already asked that...
Anyway, enough about this weapons system or another.What do you think about the deteriorating(?)situation in Pakistan? To what extent does the Taliban threaten the Pakistani state? Do you think the Army is fighting them in earnest; and what about the Nukes?
To Nava: To gain an appreciation of what's happening in South Asia allow me to recommend you three websites:
1) http://www.indianexpress.com/news/neighbourhood-in-turmoil/454513/
2)http://bengalunderattack.blogspot.com/2009/05/gen-patraeus-next-two-weeks-critical.html
3) http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/US-nixes-Pak-plea-for-Indian-troop-withdrawal/articleshow/4487871.cms
There you will get all the background data that you're seeking. I don't think the average Pakistani is aware of what talibanisation is all about yet, simply because all those attending school in Pakistan since 1971 have been repeatedly taught that 'Hindu' India poses the persistent and constant existential threat to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. And the only way to counter this 'threat' is to unite under the name of Islam. It may sound warped but that's the truth. For more than 60 years the Pakistan Armed Forces have been indoctrinated and trained against such a 'threat'. Therefore, to expect Pakistan's armed forces to switch to another thought frequency overnight and now start believing that India is not the principal threat is to ask a bit too much from Pakistan's ruling civilian and military elites.
As regards the nuclear weapons deployed in Pakistan I'm not too worried about them at all since all of them and their delivery systems have been supplied by China off-the-shelf and are therefore under the total control of a detachment of China's People's Liberation Army's 2nd Artillery Corps located in Pakistan's Northern Areas.
Well I haven't heard that one before. I thought the conventional wisdom was that the US controls the nukes, to some extent anyway. Are you claiming Pakistan bought their nukes from China? And that it has a military presence within the country? Prima facie, this seems unlikely, as it would be rather hard to keep secret.
Also, I understand that Pakistan's troubled (to put it mildly) relationship with India is one of the major factors contributing to the bizarre and disconcerting dynamic that has emerged between the Army and the various radical militias. And I wonder what India could do to calm the Army down and "allow" it to fight the real threat to Pakistan's security. Not to lecture, but it seems to me to be in both countries' best interest.
To Nava:
"I thought the conventional wisdom was that the US controls the nukes, to some extent anyway."
------------------------------
The US cannot control what it did not supply. Therefore, the US can only give the impression or pretend that it knows about everything, when in reality it does not. That's why the US' anxiety levels are quite high now. If the US had the nukes under any kind of 'control' it wouldn't have made the kind of noises it is making now.
"Are you claiming Pakistan bought their nukes from China? And that it has a military presence within the country?"
---------------------------------
Yes. Those powers that deal with such matters have known about them since mid-1998 and these have also been discussed extensively in numerous seminars and conferences whose contents are available as open-source materials. Folks like Henry Kissinger and Madeleine Albright confirmed all this between mid-1998 and mid-2000 during the Clinton Administration. Even China has publicly stated that Pakistan is China's Israel and it will treat Pakistan exactly as the US treats Israel. Plain and simple. China has never minced its words.
Regarding your last remark, nothing is further from the truth. Only outwardly the Islamic Republic of Pakistan would like to blame India for all its woes purely for selfish but convenient reasons. For reasons that cannot be logically fathomed, Pakistan has always tried to maintain some kind of irrational and financially unviable 'strategic parity' with India and this is why its economy has been bankrupted since the late 1990s. On top of that, with India having lost more than 10,000 lives thus far due to the low-intensity proxy war being waged in Jammu & Kashmir since 1990, no sane individual in India will or should think of giving Pakistan any kind of breather. Lastly, returning to the 'real' existential threat to Pakistan, it has historically never arisen from India. When Pakistan was born on August 14, 1947, India recognised it within the following 24 hours, but the first country to oppose Pakistan's existence as a sovereign nation was not India, but Afghanistan. Ever since then, Pakistan has always tried its very best to have overwhelming strategic leverage against Afghanistan so that never again are Pakistan's western borders subjected to any threat. All the trouble you see now is the result of the absence of an internationally recognised border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although not spoken of in public (don't ask me why), the validity of the internationally demarcated border--called the Durand Line--between the two countries expired in 1996 and since then neither party has sat down to demarcate a new and binding international border. And now Pakistan fears that the day Afghanistan gains stability, it will demand that the Pashtun-dominated areas of Pakistan henceforth become part of Afghanistan and not Pakistan, and that the yet-to-be-demarcated international territorial boundary reflect this reality. This, my friend, is the nightmare scenario that every Pakistan civil/military decision-maker dreads, and not an Indian invasion. But Pakistan will never officially state all this as it will be an absolute contradiction of its stated policy of promoting unity among 'brotherly' Islamic countries. Therefore, it is far more convenient to publicly, persistently and loudly contribute soundbytes about the 'threat from India', while covertly waging a war of subversion and subjugation against a fellow Islamic Republic,.i.e. Afghanistan. That's the bottomline.
Then what was Khan's program about? I'll confess to my ignorance about China supplying the warheads. I mean I read that it wasn't a wholly indigenous effort and that the Chinese helped, but was under the impression that the missiles were manufactured in house and later the technology was sold around the world...
RE my second remark, I wasn't implying that Pakistan is rightfully so obsessed about India.
That's why I suggested it could be helped indirectly to recognize the real threats to its existence as more than a backwards, Islamo-Fascist state. I just figured that India, all things being relative in life, would prefer to keep the current leaders
in power over the insane Islamists.
And of course this whole paranoia with India is self serving as it diverts attention from the real grave problems that the country faces. In all fairness, similar dynamics exist to varying extents in many countries- Israel and India included.
Again I'll confess ignorance to the extent of the territorial dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Is this in your opinion the main reason for the sanctuary given to Al-Qaeda?
To Nava: Dr A Q Khan's clandestine programmes were all about enriching uranium to HEU (just like Iran) and then acquiring the production technology from North Korea (like Iran) for building the Ghauri IRBM (which is the same as the Iranian Shihab 3). But following this path didn't produce any breakthroughs as it emerged that warheads using Pu-239 were more suitable for mounting on IRBMs than were the much more bulkier warheads using HEU. But ince A Q Khan could not acquire the Pu-239 production processes from anywhere, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) stepped in in the late-1980s to begin talks with China for acquiring plutonium-production nuclear reactors. China agreed, but these reactors and the related fuel reprocessing plant were only for electricity generation (that went on line only in 2000), and China instead decided to supply off-the-shelf the 12 IRBMs and their nuclear warheads in the mid-1990s. That is the only reason why China waited until late 1998 to become a signatory to the NPT. As a result, the Ghauri IRBMs imported from North Korea are now configured to carry only conventional warheads. The same goes for the Iranian Shihab-3s and unless and until Iran acquires the capability to produce and process Pu-239 at Arak, it will never be able to have a nuclear warhead even though it already has IRBMs.
As for Pakistan being helped indirectly to recognize the real threats to its existence as more than a backwards, Islamo-Fascist state, I don't think India can or must do anything at all, as the Obama Administration is doing a fantastic job in doing just this. Let's see if the US can succeed. As for Al Qaida, those of us familiar with the dynamics of South and Central Asian geo-politics have never believed it to be as omnipotent as has been made out to be by the US. Al Qaida Mahumat was originally established by the US in the early 1980s in Saudi Arabia and its literal Arab translation means it is merely a grand database of all 'Muslim' Mujahideen that were being sent to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets between 1980 and 1989. The one that was created by Osama bin Laden was the 'International Islamic Confederation of Mujahideen for Waging Jihad Against the Crusaders, Zionists & Hindus'. This organisation came into being only after 1996. It was this umbrella organisation of global jihadists that was operating out of Afghanistan and was responsible for 9/11, and not Al Qaida as it made out to be. As is usually the case, the US has a endency of oversimplying the facts and challenges, often with disastrous consequences. Only recently has the Obama Administration begun making the right noises.
Interesting post Prasun, does this mean Pakistan's nuclear missile arsenal is limited to 12 nuke tipped IRBMs (Shaheen-II)? Do they have additional U-235 nukes for ariel delivery? What is the future of Pakistan's WMD program since Chinese supplied reactors are under IAEA safeguards. How will Babur CM get a nuke warhead?
What are the CEP of gauri and shaheen missiles? Can they be used to target our power plants and oil refineries with conventional warheads and how much effective would be they?
To SUKHOI-30 MKI: Power plants and oil refineries are large complexes that can perhaps be disabled if not destroyed by ballistic missiles. An SRBM/MRBM is accurate enough for such targets as they are spread over a large area. Complete destruction of something like refineries requires carpet bombing. Missiles are too expensive for that.
Prasun Da, I am more curious about the safety of army's ammo dumps. Every few years we hear about thousands of tons of ammo going off in fire at a major dump. What if they are attacked by missiles? Given the size of some of these dumps a single successful hit may wipe out upward of 10% of our war reserves.
HQ-9 SAM will definitely will have better operating range than MRSAM IAF going to induct
and pakis will induct HQ-9 much before WE get MRSAM
and HQ-9 sam has engough range to deny our fighters to enter paki airspace
by the way those who argue over MRSAM better than S400
s400 along with its GAMMA DE radar is in production and MRSAM not available before 2014-15
here we go again....
To Harpreet: The n-arsenal of Pakistan now stands at 10 warheads as the remaining two warheads were detonated on May 28 and 30, 1998. Both these warheads were of the tactical nuke-type. Only after these tests did China come clean with the US (when the US confronted China with clinching evidence--the radioactive plutonium's atmoshperic residue) and China admitted to its pivotal role in Pakistan's n-weaponisation and thereafter agreed to sign the NPT. Regarding the nuclear reactors supplied by China in the late 1990s they are NOT under IAEA safeguards as the slae & purchase agreement was inked when neither Beijing nor Islamabad were signatories to the NPT. These reactors and their plutonium reprocessing plants are therefore totally unsafeguarded. As for the Babur cruise missile there are presently no plans for arming them with nuclear warheads. They are meant for conventional precision strike just like the BrahMos.
To SUKHOI-30MKI: For targetting strategic installations within India the Ghaznavi, Abdali and Babur missiles are more than enough. The Ghauris are likely to be used as 'terror' weapons much like how Iran and Iraq engaged in the war of the cities in the 1980s with SCUD TBMs.
To Anon@7:11AM: Well, you got a point there, but the solution lies in storing ammo stocks in underground caverns in te forward areas, something similar to what Singapore has attempted to do.
To Anon@7:54AM: When you're comparing the HQ-9 and S-400 with the MR-SAM you're comparing apples with oranges. You seem to have overlooked the LR-SAM project. If you're convinced about the HQ-9's superior engagement envelope, then I too can similarly claim that PGMs like BrahMos can easily target the HQ-9 deployment sites. No one is saying that the S-400 is total crap. But India's priorities are totally different in terms of military industrialisation. If one can enhance one's military industrial infrastructure by co-developing systems like the MR-SAM and LR-SAM. Then why go for a system that is available off-the-shelf? Afterall, a S-400 procurement exercise, if pursued, will be an off-the-shelf purchase without any accompanying direct industrial offsets, as has been the case of Chinese imports of the S-400, when Russia flatly refused to allow China to series-produce the S-300PMU2 and S-400.
Yeah but in the end how will the LR SAM compare to the S-400? of course the former is far from operational, and this could be argued to be a risky approach, but what do you think? The range will be inferior, but how about the capabilities within the LR SAM's 150 km engagement radius?
Well, we'll just have to wait and see, won't we! It would be imprudent to speculate on the LR-SAM's performance except to assume that the LR-SAM, being developed AFTER the advent of the S-400, will defnitely be as good as, if not better than the S-400, and that's a very conservative coming expectation from me. And since India is also developing the PAD-1 and AAD for ballistic missile defence, it would be foolish for anyone to expect that the LR-SAM become a jack-of-all-trades like the S-400.
On a separate note, just had a good laugh after reading the IAF Chief's statement yesterday which described the maiden Su-30MKI crash as 'bizzare'. Maybe he said it because he is a helicopter pilot, and is not qualified on combat aircraft! (LOL!)
Well, I guess you're right. Nevertheless, could you provide any details about what advanced features the LR SAM is supposed to incorporate ? Very little is known about it (many people have claimed that the system doesn't even exist!)
and for all the controversy about the deal, there hasn't been much info as to what technical features convinced the armed forces to commit to such a large expenditure. Is it meant to work with Elta's MMR, or will the MF Star be coverted? Can it be expected to employ a similar dual mode seeker to that of the Stunner?
I'm highly surprised you haven't yet read about the LR-SAM. The CEO of IAI himself has given several statements about the LR-SAM since mid-2007. He has even officially stated that the LR-SAM will be superior to the Patriot PAC-3. Go to the two weblinks below and you will be able to get more info.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/India_Israel_to_expand_defence_ties/articleshow/4120123.cms
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/IAF_to_add_teeth_with_Israeli_missile_system/articleshow/3374511.cms
Well the two links don't say much in the way of technical information. But I found something you wrote that basically answered my questions.
Thanks
Prasun da,
ekta mail korechilam - important. dekhe niyo and jokhun parbe uttor ta diye diyo.
Thanks.
Prasun wrote: On a separate note, just had a good laugh after reading the IAF Chief's statement yesterday which described the maiden Su-30MKI crash as 'bizzare'. Maybe he said it because he is a helicopter pilot, and is not qualified on combat aircraft! (LOL!)Prasun if you think that you have so much knowledge in aerospace and its allied engineering - why don't you join NAL or DRDO as a consultant instead of making fun of the people who are working for the security of the country ?. You can definitely help India by sending important details by sitting in your apartment in Malaysia. Sidenote: definitely your copy and paste skill be useful there.
Hi Prasun post new articles please.
To Anon@5:37AM: FYI it is not about "...making fun of the people who are working for the security of the country", but about cautioning them against making stupid and uncalled-for remarks even when they're staring at the facts and truth. But, judging by your last post, it appears you're as stupid as the ones that have made the stupid observations.
To BUA Da: Will do that within 24 hours.
Prasun: Nice blog...you do know your stuff. I was able to get a lot of good info reading your blog. You do, however come across as arrogant and disrespectful to those who might wish to share their views...perhaps you can get your point across without having to call them names.
Prasun, why is Pakistan asking for the Predator UAV. Isn't sale of long range armed drones restricted under MTCR. Though US has exported Predators to some nations but were these armed variants? If so why they wont sell the same to Pak while they are selling F16? If not what is the point of Pakistan asking for these drones?
to NAVA AND PRASUN
THERE IS no LRSAM ,only thing exixts for air force is 70km range MRSAM
range of MRSAM has been drecreased to 70km for the benefits of israel even when superior systems exixts overseas with range of 120-150km
what is surity that we will get AESA and guidance and seeker tech tansfer ,if we don't get any of the above three then it is better to procure better systems off the shelf
and if there is LRSAM with range of 120-150km which is highly unlikely it will still be inferior to s400
those who argue superiority of MFSTAR over GAMMA DE radar they should know that GAMMA DE radar is in production while MFSTAR will still take upto 5 years
anyway GAMMA DE is able to detect
0.0001 meter squre RCS bewtween 50-60 km and some people think it can't even clear out clutter at 100km
if india can make S,L band aesa t/r modules then russian surely done it
to prasun
its range was scaled down to favour israelis
by the way israel uses PATRIOT AND ARROW anti ballistic missiles as its primary anti ballistic missile defence ,
ARROW can hit missiles at altitude of upto 50km ,
if that engagement fails then PATRIOT SAM will follow upto 30km altitude and
then if PATRIOT sam fails MRSAM will go to engage incoming missiles
prasun can wou tell when were those mig21 bison aircraft inducted in IAF
i mean
how many years ago before upgrading to bison standard those mig21 were inducted
and what is total technical life of mig21
i think ADA has already said that these bisons are good for another 1000 hours even completing their technical life hours
To Anon@ 10:28:00 AM: Boy you have a lot of catching up to do, read the previous thread.
Also GAMMA DE is similar to L-band Green Pine that we have already acquired. Happy!
PAK FA will be 2 engined and
HAL/ADA better develop single engined 5 gen aircraft or develop internal bays for tejas
going for PAK FA AND 2 engined MCA is nothing but a foolish thing to do
by developing internal bays for tejas is much more easier thing to do and accomplish than going to develop two engined aircraft from bottom up
Boy you have a lot of catching up to do, read the previous thread.
Also GAMMA DE is similar to L-band Green Pine that we have already acquired. Happy!
--------------------------
read first what i said mfstar isn't available before 2014 and by then russinas also have s,x band radars
and green pine radar isn't mobile and what is deployment time for green pine radar compared to 5-10 minutes for gamma de
To Anon@10:43:00 AM: Put down your vodka. Read this document -
http://www.es.northropgrumman.com/solutions/mesa/assets/aesa_techpaper.pdf
and start counting how many generations Russia has catching up to do. Remember they are just piecing together their first or second fighter AESA.
To Anon@10:02AM: Many thks for your compliments. A slight correction or clarification, though: I'm not arrogant and disrespectful to those who might wish to share their views, but when 'those' entities come to my blog to give uncalled-for advise (telling me what to do with whom and where) or make unwanted remarks that stink of ignorance, I do have the right to make my rebuttals in kind. If those entities or anyone else want to avoid my rebuttals, all they have to do is stay away from my blog. Afterall, I don't advise others how to run their lives and therefore would like 'those' entities to adhere to the norm of recoprocity.
To Harpreet: It is precisely due to the MTCR that Pakistan has thus far been unable to obtain the Predators and have therefore gone to the Italians to obtain the less-capable Falco UAVs that will be fitted with PICO-SAR, a miniaturised synthetic aperture radar from SELEX Airborne Sensors. Pakistan's greatest operational disadvantage is the lack of battlefield surveillance platforms that can look up to 300km deep into the ndian landmass straddling the India-Pakistan border areas. Therefore, the Pakistan Army can only engage in estimates-based warfare for the time-being, unless and until the Army or PAF acquires Predator-like UAVs from China (the WZ-2000). Interestingly, if you recall, the Pakistan Army had way back in the mid-1980s asked the US for the Grumman Mohawks fitted with belly-mounted SLARs for battlefield surveillance, but the deal didn't go through, just like the M-1A1 MBTs and E-2C Hawkeyes (with APS-125 radars) were on the verge of being sold to Pakistan.
PS: Hope you've seen the TV news footage earlier today which showed a destroyed Pakistan Army Al Zarrar MBT being disabled by the Taliban by RPGs.
To Anon@10:28AM: Dude, claiming that the LR-SAM does not exist means that you're accusing both the Indian Defence Minister and the DRDO of lying! For heaven's sake, the Defence Minister has already officially stated in Parliament that the LR-SAM project exists. What more you do need to believe? As for tech-transfers for bot the MR-SAM and LR-SAM, IAI has already created the JV with TATA called NOVA, while RAFAEL has teamed up with BEL. Both these JVs were officially disclosed during Aero India 2009. Regarding MF-STAR, it has been available since 2007 for anyone to buy.
To Anon@10:36AM: The MiG-21bis has been available since the mid-1970s and the upgrade project was taken up only in 1996. Regarding total technical service life, even the MiG-21Ms have a few hundred hours left in them. It would have been a good idea if the DRDO along with IAI (which specialises in autopilots, among other things) had converted these aircraft into unmanned target drones and used them for AAA firing practice or for evaluating the performance parameters of SAMs like the Akash, instead of using the far less realistic 'Lakshya' target drones. I say this because some ex-IAF MiG-21Ms have already been shipped off to IAI where they will be converted into unmanned target drones for the MR-SAM's R & D phase.
To Anon@10:38AM: Don;t confuse the PAK-FA with the twin-engined FGFA. The PAK-FA is the alleged Russian equivalent of the F/A-22 Raptor. The FGFA is a totally different platform and until the India-Russia MoU on co-developing the FGFA was inked last year, the DRDO had the MCA project which has now morphed into the FGFA. Therefore, the FGFA and MCA are now the same, and not two different platforms. If you compare the officially stated MTOWs of the FGFA and MCA, you will reach the same conclusion.
as if i didn't read all that
americans said they could build PESA radars for fighters in 60s
but htey couldn't deploy on fighters because of cooling and space in aircraft but russians did that with zaslon radar which was most powerful after this russians had bars N011 which was most powerful when IAF bought this radar
even now russinas has irbis e radar which outclasses several western aesa radars altough it is 30 years old tech
even europenas use L band aesa radars and still building them
and US also deployed their first aesa radar apg63(v2)on fighters only by 2002 and this was the same time when IAF deployed mki with bars,and both apg63(v2) and BARS have similar detection ranges
till now US using PESA radars for patriot and AEGIS system and only by 2011-12 thse SAM will get aesa radars
L band aesa radars aren't inferior lot more depend on power to be used by radar and each T/R module ,only US making X band land based radars but they are costly and there is no european or israeli X band radar for land based or for navy exixt
only europeans have s band sampson and l band smart l radar in production and russians aren't behind with their l band radar
israel will have s band radar for export only by 2014
US spending much more than russians and europenas but US systems cost much more than russian systems but russians do it in much more cost effective way
only naval aesa radar available for export is SAMRT L AND SAMPSON RADAR
MF STAR ISN'T available even now otherwise navy already mouted this radars on thier ships
then why navy going for LM08 2D d band radar EVEN WHEN THEY CAN HAVE SAMPSON OR SMARTL RADAR
by the way what is aegis system
iF SM-3 missile isn't included ,that damn SM-3 missile cost $ 10 million each and if someone wants to buy 50 of these missile he has to pay $ 500 million for that AND EVEN IF price is reduced for SM-3 missile to $ 400 million for 50 of them then it will still be very costly
now a shivalik class frigate cost $ 350 million per frigate
hey prasun what do you think the cost of three aegis sytems offered for p15a
just see aussies paying $ 8 billion US for three destroyers fitted with aegis system
i think aegis system will not cost more than
$ 1.5 billion for three ships but it should be less than a billion dollars for 3 ships ,so aussies paying hefty $ 6.5 billion extra just for 3 ships
To Anon@11:48AM: If I were to devise a techno-economic matrix aimed at examining the viability of procuring the AEGIS system, I'm sure the financial figures you've quoted are well worth it. No complaints from me. Why? Simply because of the awesome theatre air defence capabilities it offers. What you seem to have done is just taken into account the procurement costs and there too you're assuming that the costs only pertain to the acquisition of AEGIS-equipped warships. What you're apparently overlooking is the net-centric capabilities of AEGIS. For instance, early warning of inbound ballistic missiles will not originate from the shipborne X-band AESA radars, but from the US' DSP family of early warning satellites. Only after receiving such inputs from the satellites will the shipborne AESA radar be activated for target acquisition and target engagement. To sum up, these are the capabilities a navy acquires when procuring AEGIS-equipped warships. Imagine if a navy acquires a non-AEGIS system (like APAR) but has to operate without the capabilities offered by the DSP satellites, t will only result in the APAR operating in a degraded and underutilised manner. Therefore, you must realise that if the US is offering the AEGIS to India, it also means that the US is also willing to offer the necessary interfaces with the DSP satellites. Such a capability would not be possible to acquire if India selects the APAR or Sampson or a futuristic X-band MF-STAR, as the US will deny the interfaces. Bottomline: if you buy the AEGIS, you will benefit enormously from the global chain of DSP satellites owned by the US. If you buy anything else, you will be gropping in the dark, totally clueless.
but prasun one more thing is that there is glonass and indian and israeli origin satellites in sky as well
and number of setellites will only increase and russian and israeli setellites can also be connected to russian and israelis sam systems as well
but again aegis sytem is more or less compared to s300 pmu2
because an/spy-1 pesa radar can be compared to 92N2E Grave Stone,CHEESE BOARD PESA radars ,and these russian pesa radars can also be used in 4 faced configuration as used in aegis ships
and the range and altitude of SM-2missile can be compared to 200km range missiles of s300pmu2
and setellite guidance can be provided by glonass ,israel and indian setellites
but again naval s300pmu2,s400 are lot more cheaper
gamma de radar can be elevated to 15meters from ground level while green pine is too heavy for this
when will agni-3 missile be tested ,it was tested last in in april
prasun,
Is the PAD a definitive missile for the BMD role or is it a carrier missile to evaluate sensors? It is Liquid fueled and weighs nearly 5 tons(i think) and one TEL seems to carry only one missile? Is a new missile larger than AAD but smaller than PAD in development which will carry sensors and other systems which are being tested on board the PAD?
can the ctol varient of Nishant UAV be used in hunter-killer role? It was displayed at the AI-09
Prasun, yes I saw the destroyed tank, but I wonder if the Pakistanis still see it. Take a look at this small debate I had yesterday. I tend to stay anonymous on political issues to keep them less charged and less devoid of rationality.
Anyway what little emerged of it shows how people justify their beliefs howsoever irrational they may be. Decades of conditioning cannot be undone in a stroke. We should not take the current Pakistani action as a "wake up". They have to be kept under pressure to keep them from doing more flips.
With tanks destroyed, troops being ambushed and tens of thousands being displaced I hardly have the heart to ask this "ASIAN DEFENCE" guy what he now thinks of his theory of Pakistan deploying less equipped Paramilitary forces to fight Taliban’s and get funds( US aid) to equip them. Was $500,000 aid for the Paramilitary worth this?
Harpreet can you prvoide link to video or pictures of destroyed tank?
Prasun K Sengupta can tell me the range of HQ-16 . i am not abm=ble to find any hard data on that. only able to find estimates that put it range 40km,65k and 90km
Prasun da, an article of Oxford University on Cold Start Strategy-http://users.ox.ac.uk/~mert1769/Ladwig,%20Cold%20Start%20NPS%20Paper.pdf says that army would not be able to effectively engage pakistan of atleast 10 more years. What is your analysis on Cold Start Strategy regarding conforting pakistan if we were to fight a war today?
To Anon@11:57:00 PM:
This video is not complete and it wrongly identifies the tank as Al-Khalid instead of Al-Zarar.
Here is the link-
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZJV56caxh1w
To Anon@3:36PM: The DSP-type satellites are not like the Glonass or TecSAR/Polaris/RISAT-type satellites. Each DSP satellite is like a mini-Hubble space telescope, but looking at Earth to spot ballistic missile lauches in the boost phase. Neither the Russians nor the Israelis are anywhere closer to even developing such satellites.
To Anon@3:44PM: There's no need to elevate the Green Pine LRTR to even a metre above ground since the will not be required to overcome any kind of ground clutter or ground-based physical obstacle. Such radars are normally sited on hilltops or in elevated terrain and are pointed towards the sky. The same also applies to the LRTR for the US THAAD system.
To Anon@3:49PM: The Agni-3 was meant to be a technology demonstrator from which the 5,500km-range land-based Agni-5 and submarine-launched, 8,500km-range SLBM are being derived and developed. Most probably the land-based Agni-5 will be test-fired later this year.
To Sachin Sathe: The PAD is still being developed to the PAD-1 configuration that can intercept targets like the M-9 and M-11 TBMs in their re-entry phase out to an altitude of 120km. There is also another development project to develop an interceptor missile that can intercept IRBMs and MRBMs at an altitude of 200km.
As for the CTOL variant of the Nishant, the mere fact that it is configured for recovery back on land means that it will not be launched one a one-way journey, i.e. as a hunter-killer drone like the Harpy.
To Harpreet: Here's another weblink showing the destroyed Al Zarar MBT: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_9fZIR7Hjkw&feature=channel
To Anon@12:15AM: the HQ-16's range is 35km as it is an E-SHORADS.
To SUKHOI-30MKI: I did read that analysis quite some time back and ave the following comments:
1) It is not called the 'Cold Start Doctrine'. Officially, the Indian Army refers to it as the 'Pro-Active Strategy'.
2) The Army prepared this new warfighting doctrine without any official inputs from the Indian Air Force. Therefore, the IAF is now confronting the Army and saying that it will not be able to compensate for the Army's acute lack of field artillery firepower and consequently, will not be able to provide the critical close air support for the first 72 hours of hostilities it is not until 2017 that the IAF have aircraft in sufficient numbers to undertake simultaneous battlefeld air interdiction and close air support sorties. Without such close air support, therefore, the Army will have to wait until 2017 to fully implement its new warfighting doctrine. Of course, things can change if and only if the Army is given a free hand to induct motorised 155mm/52-cal howitzers in large numbers (about 800) and is also empowered to raise its planned Combat Aviation Brigades equipped with attack helicopters and UCAVs.
Thanks for Video link and information about the range of HQ-16 Prasun
So basically HQ-16 is an Aster-15 / Spyder MR/LR class missile.Is it Chinese made or just another copy of some Russian missile? Does it have active radar guidance?
Prasun what is your views about this
http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/05/airforce_UAV_050909/
Pakistan reported developing armed UAV
By Usman Ansari - Staff writer
Posted : Saturday May 9, 2009 8:17:26 EDT
ISLAMABAD — After years of watching U.S. drones operate along its Afghan border, Pakistan is working on its own Predator-like unmanned aerial vehicle to undertake the same mission, sources here said.
The sources said the country’s air force and government-owned defense conglomerate, the National Engineering and Scientific Commission, are flight-testing a new-design aircraft to be equipped with a NESCom-designed laser designator and laser-guided missiles. The Burraq UAV is named for a winged horse creature in Islamic tradition, similar to Pegasus.
According to local news reports, Pakistan is focusing its unmanned aircraft efforts on upgrading various older UAVs with Chinese help.
But the sources note that no domestically produced UAV is large enough to heft both a missile and a targeting system. The military’s most capable UAV is the air force’s Selex Galileo Falco, which can laser-designate targets for other platforms but cannot deliver munitions.
Officials with the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Defence Production here refused to confirm or deny the program’s existence. A spokesman for the military’s Inter Services Public Relations said it was “not ready to give a statement on the issue at this time.”
One former air force officer said the notion of a Pakistan-developed hunter-killer UAV is credible.
“You only have to see our track record,” said Kaiser Tufail, a retired air commodore. “We have some fantastic achievements in the field of defense.”
Tufail said Pakistan needs such a weapon. Anti-terror operations on the frontier require “hours and hours of round-the-clock reconnaissance,” married with the ability to strike quickly when a target is spotted, he said.
Help from China?
Analysts were more dubious about Pakistan’s ability to produce a laser-guided missile, but they noted that help might be found in China or Turkey.
Turkey, with whom Pakistan has an agreement to cooperate on UAV development, is seeking an armed UAV, preferably the Predator or MQ-9 Reaper. This UAV may someday be armed with the UMTAS infrared guided anti-tank missile being developed by the Turkish firm Roketsan to arm the T-129 attack helicopter.
Pakistan could simply produce China’s new CH-3 unmanned combat air vehicle, “or co-produce any number of Chinese components to assemble a unique UCAV,” said Richard Fisher, China specialist and senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center in Washington.
“China has also developed the unique AR-1, a 45-kilogram, laser-guided attack missile, apparently designed specifically for light winged or helicopter UCAVs,” he said.
http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2009/05/...rce_UAV_050909/
To Anon@ 2:53AM: The HQ-16 is a motorised, truck-mounted clone of the Tor-M1E E-SHORADS.
To Anon@7:27AM: Yes, this project is a joint Pakistan-Turkey project in which the main technology/systems supplier is Selex Airborne Sensors and Galileo Avionica. Will upload more data and photos on all this in the near future.
Anon@7:27AM
Thanks Prasun
i will be waiting for uploads
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