The Indian Navy (IN) today enjoys the enviable status of possessing not one, but three different types of close-in weapon systems (CIWS) on board its principal surface combatants. While the Barak-1 and Kashtan-M CIWS have been operational since the late 1990s, the latest to join them is the Raytheon-built Vulcan Phalanx, which is on board the IN’s second largest warship (displacing 17,000 tonnes) and its first ever US-built warship--the INS Jalashva (ex-USS Trenton) landing platform dock (LPD). What follows below is a chronological recounting of events that explains how and why the IN has been acquiring CIWS suites from abroad.The first CIWS to enter service was the Barak-1 PDMS, which in November 1995 was successfully test-fired in the Mediterranean Sea by the Israeli Navy in the presence of senior IN and Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) officials led by Dr A K Kapur, the then Project Director of the indigenous Trishul VSHORADS, with a single missile successfully destroying an incoming sea-skimming subsonic anti-ship missile at a distance of 5.996km using the command line-of-sight (CLOS) fire-control technique. By then the Barak-1 was already operational with the navies of Chile, Israel, Singapore and Venezuela. Subsequently, the IN proceeded to Russia where the Kashtan-M combined gun/missile CIWS made by Tulamashzavod Production Association, was demonstrated in the Baltic Sea. The visiting IN/DRDO delegation thereafter discovered that the Kashtan-M’s 9M311 missile was unable to engage sea-skimming targets at a distance below 1.5km (as opposed to the Barak-1’s 500 metres) and its warhead weight was only 9kg, as opposed to the Barak-1’s 22kg. Vice Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat, the then Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, later confirmed the Barak-1’s superiority in an evaluation report prepared for Navy HQ. Responding to this report, the then DRDO Secretary and Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) Dr A P J Abdul Kalam on February 29, 1996 wrote a letter to the then Defence Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav in which he acknowledged delays and deficiencies in the Trishul SHORADS’ indigenous R & D effort, which was to have been completed by 1994. Dr Kalam subsequently wrote: “The types of immediate threats and proposed acquisition of seven Barak-I systems by the IN have been presented. The Navy has confirmed that these Barak-1s will be installed on the aircraft carrier INS Viraat, plus three Project 15 and three Project 16A warships.... The above proposal by the Navy is agreed to...” However, the DRDO’s ‘approval’ for importing the Barak-Is from Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) had two satisfy two pre-conditions. First, “the Navy monitors and ensures the performance of the Barak-I, as claimed, and installs them at the earliest. Second, the Navy places the order immediately for Trishul SHORADS to give production thrust to the programme, whose R & D component is due for completion by 2002”.
Consequently, the Finance Wing of the MoD approved the procurement of all seven systems in 1996. By December the same year, Navy HQ completed an expanded internal paper evaluation of 12 potential CIWS options available for acquisition, including the THALES’ Crotale NG from France, BAE Systems’ VL Seawolf, OTOBreda of Italy’s Myriad, the Barak-1, Goalkeeper from THALES Naval Nederland, and the Kashtan from Russia’s Tulamashzavod. Upon being presented with results of the evaluation, Mulayam Singh Yadav on December 16 sought to know from the DRDO the R & D status of the Trishul SHORADS and whether it was possible to import the Barak-1 in smaller numbers for other IN warships to save on foreign currency. The DRDO did not answer Yadav’s queries. In January 1997, Navy HQ initiated a proposal as part of the planned modernisation of INS Viraat to retrofit it with the Barak-1 PDMS. It also urged the MoD once again to acquire a follow-on six Barak-1 PDMS for installation on board six of its warships. On February 9, the government’s Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS) approved the Barak-1’s procurement for the Viraat alone. Subsequently, a high-level delegation led by the then Defence Secretary Taposh Banerji visited Israel and on February 14 inked a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for purchasing one Barak-1 PDMS suite (comprising 32 vertically launched missiles with 12km-range, twin EL/M-2221 STGR fire-control radars, and an ELTA-built EL/M-2238 STAR air/surface search radar) for US$17 million. On October 3, the CCNS approved the procurement of an additional six Barak-1 PDMS. However, no contracts were inked for the seven PDMS suites. On November 17, Russia’s Rosoboronexport State Corp and the MoD inked a US$1 billion contract for three Project 1135.6 guided-missile frigates (FFG) to be built by Russia’s Baltisky Zavod shipyard for the IN. During prior price-cum-contractual negotiations Russia had vigorously objected to the IN’s requests for installing two key non-Russian systems--Barak-1 PDMS and an integrated platform management system of Canadian origin (from L-3 MAPPS) on board these FFGs, citing prohibitive systems integration costs and systems integration risks as being the main reasons. Consequently, Russia’s offer of the Kashtan-M CIWS, built by Tulamashzavod, was accepted without any rancour by both Navy HQ and the DRDO. (The same is also the case with the three follow-on Project 1135.6 FFGs ordered in 2006).
On November 2, 1998 the then Defence Minister George Fernandes directly received a letter from the then Chairman of IAI which sought Fernandes’ personal intervention to get one Barak-1 PDMS inducted into the IN for the Viraat. Within the next 20 days, Navy HQ, then headed by Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat, wrote to Dr Kalam for seeking his concurrence to import one Barak-1 PDMS, and also pressed the MoD for an early constitution of the Price Negotiations Committee (PNC). On November 3, Dr A Sivathanu Pillai, the then Chief Controller of the DRDO’s Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (and now CEO of BrahMos Aerospace and also the DRDO’s Chief Controller for R & D), wrote a letter to Dr Kalam suggesting that an indigenous CIWS solution--the Trishul SHORADS’s sea-skimming variant—would not only provide an option, but also meet the IN’s desired induction timeframe. He suggested that an immediate go-ahead be given for completing development of this variant of the Trishul on a fast-track basis (with the help of additional financial allocations), and called for the Barak-1 import option to be closed. He explained that if the end-user was financially committed to the project the results will be faster, while imports will only discourage the scientists.
On November 26, 1998 NHQ again wrote to the Defence Minister’s scientific adviser (Dr Kalam) and sought his early concurrence for importing one Barak-1 PDMS. Dr Kalam replied on January 20, 1999, saying that he had no objections as the CCNS had already approved its import for INS Viraat on October 3, 1997. Based on this, NHQ began constituting the PNC for the purchase. On June 15, 1999, at the height of Operation Vijay, Admiral Sushil Kumar, the then Chief of the Naval Staff, proposed the immediate importing of two Barak-1 PDMS. Dr Kalam opposed this proposal in a letter dated June 23, 1999. In the letter, Dr Kalam said: “It has been brought to the Raksha Mantri’s notice that the to-be-imported PDMS has a failure rate of nearly 50% as witnessed by the DRDO during firing trials by the IN. Even the cost of failure analysis by foreign suppliers is very high. We will be at the mercy of foreign suppliers for spares and support during the life-cycle of the entire system. Importing of any PDMS will take one to two years and there is no reason that the Trishul cannot be made ready before that”. On June 25, after meeting Dr Kalam, Admiral Kumar submitted a fresh proposal for procuring a total of seven Barak-1 PDMS to George Fernandes, who in turn overruled Dr Kalam’s opinions against importing the Barak-1, and formally gave the go-ahead for Admiral Kumar’s proposal on June 28. A draft CCNS note was put up to the then Defence Secretary T R Prasad, who on August 30 said that the CCNS had deferred its decision on the proposal, which would be considered by the next central government. On September 3, Fernandes wrote back to Prasad saying that the CCNS had to be apprised of the urgency of importing the Barak-1 PDMS and its approval had to be sought. On March 2, 2000 the CCNS, after taking note of the DRDO’s objections with respect to two of paragraphs on the CCNS’ draft approval note, approved for the second time the purchase of seven Barak-1 PDMS. On August 4, Dr A K Kapur wrote a letter to the chief of the PNC for Barak-1, Vice Admiral P C Jacob, who was then also the IN’s Vice Chief, stating that the formal evaluation task was not assigned to the combined IN/DRDO team that visited Israel in November 1995. Dr Kapur further wrote that a more comprehensive system for evaluating the Barak-1 was required before procuring them in quantity.
On October 23, the US$268.63 million (Rs5.8 billion) contract for procuring seven Barak-1 PDMS, including 224 missile rounds (worth US$69.13 million) and five EL/M-2238 3-D STAR surface/air search radars built by IAI’s ELTA subsidiary, was inked. The Barak-1s would subsequently be retrofitted on the Viraat, three Project 15 guided-missile destroyers or DDGs, and three Project 16A FFGs (Brahmaputra, Beas and Betwa). The EL/M-2238 radars were planned to be installed on the Viraat, the three Project 16A FFGs and one Project 16 FFG (INS Ganga). In December, the MoD formally informed Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence that there will be ‘considerable delays’ in the induction of the DRDO-developed Akash and Trishul missile systems by India’s armed forces. On April 4, 2001 in the aftermath of the Tehelka revelations, Navy HQ publicly defended the Barak-1’s procurement, citing unavailability of the Trishul still being developed by the DRDO and the Pakistan Navy’s operational inventory of submarine-launched MBDA-built SM-39 Exocet and Boeing-built RGM-84A/AGM-84L Harpoon anti-ship cruise missiles, as being the main reasons for importing such weapons. The Navy’s then Chief of Personnel, Vice Admiral Arun Prakash, disclosed that the Barak-1s would be installed on seven principal surface combatants in the next seven years. He also cited three reasons why other proven CIWS options had not been thoroughly evaluated. First, procedural difficulties would have inordinately delayed the induction of the chosen CIWS (Barak-1) if other systems had been brought into the fray. Second, the imposition of post-Pokhran-2 sanctions by the UK and US would also have stood in the way of acquiring a Western system. That left Israel as the only country capable of supplying vertically-launched CIWS suites compact enough to be retrofitted on existing IN warships.
In October, the DRDO and the three armed services jointly undertook a comprehensive review of the Trishul SHORADS project. The system was consequently found to be deficient on three counts: One, the missile’s guidance and control using the CLOS technique was encountering successive failures as the target-tracking radar’s beam (from the TMX-EO for the naval variant and BEL-built PIW-519 Flycatcher radar for the army and air force variants) was suffering from intermittent target lock-on breaks that resulted in the SAM missing the target widely. Secondly, development of the three-axis stabilisation system for Trishul had been inordinately delayed due to US sanctions. It was subsequently decided that while work on the Trishul’s R & D effort would continue, the armed services would be allowed to foreclose the Trishul procurement option and meet their immediate operational requirements through imports. In May 2003, the MoD revealed that India planned to buy an additional 10 Barak-1 PDMS by 2008. Later the same year, between November 16 and 22, two Barak-1 missiles fired from INS Delhi failed to hit their targets twice in trials conducted off the coast of Mumbai. In both instances, the Barak-1s failed to intercept two Russia-built P-18 Termit anti-ship cruise missiles whose warheads had been deactivated and replaced with telemetry tracking electronics. Following detailed investigations, the failures were attributed to electro-magnetic interference problems (involving the EL/M-2221 STGR radar and the Delhi’s MR-90 Orekh illuminators used for the Shtil-1 area air defence system) that were later rectified by a team comprising engineers from the Navy’s Weapons & Electronic System Engineering Establishment (WESEE), RAFAEL Armament Development Authority (maker of the missile) and IAI. Another test-firing conducted on November 26 successfully destroyed an inbound P-18. By late 2003, the DRDO had admitted its failure to develop a shipborne Trishul SHORADS-based CIWS due to serious design deficiencies, and the massive facility it had earlier established at INS Dronacharya in Kochi exclusively for the Trishul’s firing trials was closed down. Meanwhile, after evaluating competitive offers from 13 companies from Europe, Russia and the US, the MoD inked a US$100 million contract to acquire another four Barak-1 PDMS to be installed on three Project 17 Shivalik-class FFGs and on INS Ran Vijay, a Kashin 2-class DDG. On February 21, 2004, another test-firing of the Barak-1 resulted in a direct hit against an inbound P-18.
It was in late 2004 that senior IN commanders met at NHQ to discuss a DRDO proposal to co-develop the Barak-2 (called Barak-8 by Israel), a vertically-launched, 70km-range naval SAM with anti-cruise missile interception capability. The US$350 million contract for launching this joint R & D venture was inked on January 27, 2006. In addition, the MoD committed to acquire another three Barak-1 systems for the three Project 15A DDGs. In May 2006, Admiral Arun Prakash, the then Chief of the Naval Staff, disclosed that the Barak-2 would arm all future principal surface combatants of the IN, starting 2011. By now, both Army HQ and Air HQ too had decided to seriously evaluate the Barak-2 option, given the DRDO’s inability to develop the land-mobile Akash Mk2 M-SAM before 2010. On October 16, 2006 Admiral Prakash revealed that of the 14 live-fire evaluations of the Barak-1 conducted in India thus far, 12 had scored direct hits and the other two failed, one because of human error and another due to technical reasons. Presently, negotiations are underway between the IN and its US counterpart for retrofitting the 34-year-old LPD (Jalashva) with twin SeaRAM suites to supplement the Vulcan Phalanx CIWS.—Prasun K. Sengupta
34 comments:
kastaan is better than phalnx
to prasun
not sure there is RAM launcher is provided with jalashava
u can't compare missiles in kashtan with barak but compare it with RIM116 missile
weight
RIM-116 =73.5kg
9M311missile=58kg
warhead
RIM-116 =11.3 kg
9M311 missile = 9kg
range
rim-116 =7.5 km
9M311 missile =8 km
RAM launcher and kashtan have 24 missiles which is similar
the radar for barak sam is mounted higher than kashtan and radar for barak is bigger than kashtan radar,
if barak misses its target then kashtan can take care of that target with its two guns and SAM missiles
a single kashtan does the work of two pahlanx systems,and kashatan is much compact
in jalashva phalanx gun and RAM missiles r seperate but in kashtan it has two guns along with missiles compared to only single gun in phalanx
missile in kashtan is much smaller only 58kg compared to 98kg for barak SAM
and kashtan is much more cheaper and cost effective
The SeaRAM has not yet been installed but negotiations are on the procure twin launchers. The Kashtan-M cannot be installed on the Jalashva for obvious reasons. Also, Kashtan-M & Barak-1 cannot be fitted together, just as the Kashtan-M and SeaRAM cannot. Onre usually has to choose one between the three competing systems.
Good article Prasun.
Please don't forgoet the request I made yeterday concerning the Aerospace command :-)
Prasun,
Maybe I am missing something here, but what is DRDO's role in approving the purchase of the Barack. Isn't this a Conflict of Interest since DRDO was trying to develop its own competing product to the Barack! As far as the Navy is concerned wouldn't DRDO be just another vendor like IAI, Rafael, MBDA etc trying to sell its SHORAD/CIWS system for a dollar amount. It seems that this is a fundamentally flawed procurement process.
I hope I am wrong. Thanks again for the wonderrful eye opening article.
to sengupta
y both kashtan m and brak-1 can't b fitted toghter on a ship cuz both systems have their own seperate radars,missiles and processing systems and there should b no proble with both systems on a ship cuz both systems oprate independently to each other
and using both of them only reduces the threat
barak-1 can't provide the gun power that kashtan systen uses if barak misses its taget at least kashtan systam can handle it
Re Prasun
Good article.
I have been given to understand that India & Israel are working on new rifle under FINSAS programme (not Tavor/Zittara) and a new sniper rifle (based on INSAS??). Can you find out something more about it?
infact TOR point defence system also much more compact than barak-1
TO PRASUN
NOT sure y navy didn't consider
Pantsir-S1
Air Defense Missile
but not sure it is meant for navy or not but it is good for air force and army
I think you forgot to mention the oldie AK-630M which is the most widely used CIWS in the IN.
Future IN ships will have a combination of Barak-1 and a advanced variant of AK-630M ( perhaps the AK-630M1-2 ) as standard CIWS.
Its possible few Russian built ships may come with Kashtan-M CIWS if they shove that off our throat.
is this your company???????
http://www.trishulgroup.com/index.htm
To Anon@7:49PM: In the early 1990s the DRDO sort of gate-crashed into the process of weapons procurements process and convinced the MoD that unless the DRDO did an independent audit of the projected requirements to find out whether such weapon systems could be produced indigenously, weapons imports from abroad would not proceed. In other words, what the DRDO actually wanted was more access to R & D funds so that the IGMDP targets could be fulfilled, and mind you all this was happening when the country was facing a financial crisis. But the main problem then was that the DRDO could not supply indigenous solutions within the required time-frame. Hence, when the shit hit the fan in mid-1999 the Navy was already in dire straits. In fact, since since 1996 when the US exported three P-3C Orion Update 2.5s along with AGM-84 Harpoons the Indian Navy had already sounded the alarm bells. But the Govt of India and its MoD turned a blind eye to this. That's why the Navy's desperation increased to an all-time high when faced with the prospect of all-out naval war in the northern Arabian Sea. That is the main and only reason the then CNS Admiral Arun Prakash was gunning for the Barak-1. Everything else being speculated about his involvement in promoting only the Barak-1 at the expense of other available CIWS is pure nonsense. In any case, why should IAI or RAFAEL try to bribe a CNS who had already been convinced long ago about the operational requirement for Barak-1? Logically, the only ones who needed to be bribed were those civilian decision-makers within the MoD whose consent and approvals were required to make the Barak-1 procurement a top priority and therefore convince the Union Ministry of Finance to give approval for establishinbg the Price Negotiations Committee ASAP.
To Austin: The AK-630 family of six-barrelled guns are indeed used as CIWS but not specifically as anti-missile defence systems. These guns, when used simultaneously against as inbound anti-ship missile like those of the Termit family, are moderately effective (but not more than 60%, according to Navy firing trials way back in the 1980s and 1990s), but, like the Vulcan Phalanx, are absolutely useless against present-day sea-skimming anti-ship cruise missiles like the MM-40, A/R/UGM-84 or C-802A. And when it comes to intercepting supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles, the only viable solution today and in future is the hit-to-kill anti-missile missile. The latest version of the Kashtan-M's missile round is touted to have a range of 22km, but that's not what the Indian Navy is procuring.
Thanks Prasun for this article and the note on IN pursuing SeaRAM. Also, thanks for the additional line space between paragraphs.
Recently, I became aware that ARDE is in the process of developing (with an outside partner) a family of munitions. Would happen to have any more information on that program?
To Prasun: The reason why AK-630M is not effective is because it lacks a closed loop guidance/control . hence it cannot make fine correction to take care of low flying sea skimming missile.
The idea of AK-630M is just to create a wall of lead against incoming target and hope it does damage.
As far as dealing with supersonic anti-ship missile , I think its only the russian which claim that Kashtan-M can effectively deal with it , but like all russian claim we need to take it with a bag full of salt.
The only way one can deal with supersonic AShM is go for a layered defense , any CIWS/Hard kill option will be too close for comfort.
To Austin: It will therefore be interesting to see what additional capabilities the combination of EL/M-2248 MF-STAR/Barak-1/Barak-2 will offer with regard to hard-kill interception options against inbound supersonic ASCMs. In any case, when I was in Israel last year I was told by both IAI/ELTA & RAFAEL that a novel sensor-fusion solution (combining RF/optronic sensors) originally being developed for the Barak-2 will now also be incorporated into the Barak-1, whose engagement range will also be increased by 15%. For the Kashtan-M the Ruskies are nowq proposing a modular upgrade under which the principal target acquisition/engagement sensor-cum-fire control system will be a navalised NO-11M Bars PESA radar coupled to a PHOENIX IRST. This solution was originally developed for the Pantsyr E-SHORADS meant for export to the UAE.
To left wing nut job@10:42AM: ARDE is developing glide bombs that could also be fitted with add-on laser seekers or GPS receivers to convert such standoff weapons as PGMs. ARDE is also trying to develop 300mm MBRL-launched rockets with 120km-range (an enhanced Smerch-M, so to speak). But to date, no other data has been released by ARDE in the public domain (such as during DEFEXPO). Maybe during next February's Aero India 09 expo something more would be unveilled, such as conceptual drawings/posters/illustrations or photos of functional prototypes.
To Raj@10:35PM: The FINSAS project is not just about developing a family of new-generation firearms, but about making the future infantry soldier fully functional and more lethal within a digital network-centric encironment. Therefore, more emphasis is being placed on developing not direct-fire weapons, but indirect fire support weapon systems which will be fired by mechanised infantry forces from the secure confines of an APC or AIFV, but will be guided to their targets by loitering mini-UAVs. The mini- and micro-UAVs, on the other hand, will also be launched from APCs or AIFVs or even by hand (in case of micro-UAVs) will be tasked with target acquisition/designation even for Platoon-level or Squad-level operations. In other words, the FINSAS project will revolutionise and redefine the very concept of infantry-centric combined arms warfare. Several such technologies are already being tried out in Afghanistan by the Germans, US and British forces under real combat conditions.
1. Barak deal was a big scandal and thats all. Lame excuses were given for Suresh Nanda and gang to make money.
2. Out of topic but speaking about UAVs hows DRDOs plan to make a MALE? Ay progress
3. Finally, excellent analysis. How is the info available to you? I mean you r saying exact dates of letters and all.. you must have a mole :-|
4. Oh ya - So whens FINSAS gonna be ready?
To Anon@11:36AM: No need for any moles as the Indian Navy at that time did a fairly good job between 2002 and 2004 of briefing the press with dates and related data pertaining to the Barak-1 procurement. Regarding the MALE-UAV, the first prototype of the 'Rustam' is being prepared for flight-tests. It is actually the Light Canard Research Aircraft, an experimental model (the Rutan Long-EZ) whose design was bought outright by the National Aerospace Laboratories in the early 1990s from the US-based Rutan Aircraft Factory.
HI so what are the further plans of Trishul when there seems 2 b no scope 4 it anymore??..
So thats how Rustam got its name....
Is it only the airframe design that was bought out? How bout d engine?
thanx for keepin us updated buddy....
Ur efforts are highly appreciated...
Please keep the good stuff coming....
whats next
whats next
whats next
whats next
whats next
To all the beauties!!@12:46PM: In essence, the Trishul SHORADS project served as a good learning curve, so it is not all a case of 'sunken costs'. Regarding the Rustam, the ARDE has already come up with some Rotax-type piston engines that were displayed during DEFEXPO 2006. You can get data on the Rustam from NAL's website.
Prasun, you need to change the background color from paki green to something more eye pleasing... it is a pain to read with green background
thanks
just some simple background would do sengupta. whats important is the xcellent content and not the backgrounds.
but yes we gotta weed out the porkistani color
Re Prasun
There are two variants of Rustom, One has MTOW of 600kg and second with (turboprop?) engine has a MTOW of 750kg.
Also there were lot of brouchers posted of small turbojet/fan engine being developed for cruise missiles on BRF (can't seem to locate it now). Which was a smaller engine than PTAE-7 for Lakshaya.
Re FINSAS-Iknow about it a bit but am not able to get any info on the new rifle and sniper rifle under development
To Raj@1:45AM: The Rustam will be piston-engined, while the other two UAVs planned for indigenous development--Gagan MALE-UAV & Pawan low altitude long endurance UAV--are planned to have turboprop powerplants to overcome the problems of crosswinds that have imposed severe flight restructions on the Searcher 2 and Heron 2 under certain operating conditions and low & medium altitudes.
Regarding turbofans for cruise missiles, I'm not aware of the existence of any programme at GTRE/NAL to develop such engines and the only engine developed to date by GTRE for such vehicles is the PTAE-7 turbojet. Anything smaller and more efficient than the PTAE-7 will have to be a turbofan like the 36MT from NPO Saturn.
trishul was deficient on three counts you said,
what is the third count prasun? you mention only two.
RE Prasun
Can you tell the weight of Barak-2/8/NG missile, as it will help us in comparing it with other missiles
I don't have the figures with me.
I am reasonably certain talking to DRDO people that there is Rustom MTOW 750kg turboprop powered.
I will try to do google search on new GTRE micro gas turbine engine.
Here are some details of the engine for cruise missile.
ETBRDC propose to develop into and Aero-engine house of international level in the years to come. Several projects are being envisaged to be taken up.
A twin spool Turbofan Engine is being proposed to power a Cruise Missile under design. ETBRDC will jointly develop this engine with NAL and GTRE. The engine is small; the technology involved is as complex as any bigger engine. Since the usage is for missile application, no external help can be sought and the engine has to be wholly indigenous. This is a challenging task and ETBRDC is confident that it can meet the challenge.
http://164.100.24.208/ls/CommitteeR/Defence/17threport.pdf
Power output:10kW
Fuel: Kerosene/LPG
Mass flow rate: 0.13kg/s
Compressor pressure ratio: 3
Turbine inlet temperature: 900 C
SMALL GAS TURBINE ENGINE
(Straight Jet)
(Thrust = 2.25 kN, SFC =1.1 kg/hr/kg)
340 mm diameter* 670 mm length
one thing we should understand that in CIWS CATEGORY there is a group defence system and point defence system.
point defence system is designed to kill target coming to hit your ship while group defence is for portecting a consort or other ships also if any missile is fired on it ..... kashtan is a point defence system and barak-1 is a group defence system. if we see the technlolgy of operation both system are designed for differnt approch ..kashtan is maintainence intensive system while barak's failure rate are severe but still kashtan is better than barak
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